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Attdi:f'feren"t periods in the diplomatic history of'·' the Ub.i t:edl 
States, political and eoonomi~interests have shifted from Europe 
to Asia, from the Atlantic to "the Pacific, from the as.rribbean,tb 
the China sea, -and a~in back to .the .Mnerican c-ontinents. Ameri-
can foreign policies have been adapted, changed and~transf'ormed:: 
ll. 
t'b correspond "to or compromise with these various conflicting:; in.-. 
"teres"ts. Many administrations and State Department officials have 
attempted, sometimes even through lon~range policy planningi to 
directtand guide diplomatio.negotia"tions so that political and ec-
onomi~ interests can be fulfilled. Charles Beard, in ~e Idea o~ 
:tf'ational In"terest:t; sets f'or.th "the argument that the idea of a posi-
tti. ve national interest·: implies the consolidation of' the efforts of'' 
commerce and agriculture, the promotion of' trade in all parts of 
"the world, and the maintenance of "that trade With a powerful navy. 
Moreover, Beardts statements on· national interestdmply that he 
l:ielieves the Repul)lican party .. ,"tradi"tionally holds to this concep"tt 
of'~commeroial and territorial expansion as a matter of' policy and· 
that .the Republican party is accountable for emphasizing interest·:~ 
rather than nationality in its foreign policies. 
· TheeRealpolitik of "the Republican party (since its inception) 
has: emphasizedr.: the need .for expansion in foreign markets as india-
pensible to the prosperity of~.Mnerioan business. So, in essence 
writes ·Beard. He continuess Dollarrdiploma.cy-, fur the Republican: 
party,·especially, was a "discreet combination11 of~the political 
and economic interests, mentio.ned above, and was attained by a 
lL 
aonscious, deliberate, never a haphazard method. FriU'ther-.; the 
Gi>vernment should leg~tima.tely take the initiative t() pursue these_: 
interests. BQth parties, Re.publican and~1 nemooratic:; historically 
. . 
were in.agreement-ton the necessity of commerce~as reflecting_nation-
al interest; but the difference was in the emphasis the Democrats 
.. 
placed on markets for agrarian produce and the emphasis the Ftederal-
ist-Whig-Republicans placedfon the protection o~internal manufacture 
(tariff). 
ItLhas, then, been a contention that the Republican party, 
interested in a policy ofcommercial expansion, had intentionally 
pursued this policy in the Far East. Although it was under B£Demo-
e-ra tier-: administration that representati vee of the United S:tates 
ggvernment were first appointed to negotiate trade treaties With 
Ohina, according to historical incident~ the Republican party has,~ 
been identified with Far Eastern policy. The United States gqvern-
menttsent Cfi.leb CUshing to China in 184) with instructions.to dema.ndJ 
ll 
Gharles A~ Beard~ Tlie Idea of National Interest-~ New Yorks The 
Macmillan OOmpany, 19)4, P• 107e 
equal commercial rights to thoseewhich Ohina granted to favored' 
nations. This mission was completed dtiring the administration' 
of~ Presidentt·Tff~er, a Vemocrattfrom Virginia. H:Owever, in~ 1852, 
the United States government attempted to enter into a more formal 
commercial arrangement with Japan. OOmmodore Ferry was sent to · 
Japanwith a streng.;naval force and he concluded a treaty in 1854 ... 
Obmmodore Perry's expedition to Japan- was conducted during:_ the. 
~publican administration of the former Vice-President, Presidentt 
Falmore, a Whig~ Four years later TOwnsendcHarris, a represen-
tative for the United States government, negotiated another treaty 
with Japan which remained the basis of American relations ~ith 
Japan until the MCKinley election in, 1896. Admiral newey .took 
Manila Bay and destroyed the Spanish fleet~in 1898. The inoidentt 
of the Baxer:Rebellion in 1900 was another Far Eastern episode. 
Both of"these Far Eastern episodes occurred dllrin~;the Republican 
Administration ofrMoKinley. Therefore, the opening of" Far. Eaetenr. 
trade to the United States and otherrwestern nations was credited:~ 
tb the Republican party or to the Whig party Which preceeded it~ 
These negqtiations and incidents happened during~Republican admin-
istrations. However, the Republican party, as it.is known today, 
was not founded until 1854. Tne historical association of£the 
RSpublican partyywith the opening~·of ORina and Japan to western 
tradea has basis in fact"~> 
The relationship between the Far Eastern foreign policy/ of:. 
the United States and the Republican party has been explained by,.· 
other aspects of United States history. Some commentators on 
history, though not necessarily historians, have from time to time 
pointed to the free silver controversy in the United States, to the 
supposed importance of·~ OS.lifornia as the nearest neighbor.c of the 
Far East, and to the Republica.n-Wail.l S:t.reettinvestments in the F'S.r . .c 
Easttas reflecting, directly, official Washington policy in the Fa.ri· 
East. Silver advocates were in all probability concerned with min-
ing and trade. primarily, as were the 11 vested interests t1 of Wall 
Street and the representatives from not only California but also 
the western sea-board states, Oregon and Washington. ~ade be-
came :the common denominator:·of these seemingly di~rgenttgroups. 
However, this does not mean these groups -free silver advocates, 
commercial interests of the western states and Wall Street and the 
Republican party- had any direct and positive influence:dn shaping 
Far Eastern policy. Why the Republican party should be more in-
terested in the Far Eastt.and the Democratic party in Eilrope may 
be merely a tunrin history- or an ac~ident of history. 
Tne strategic·. importance to the United States of island 
bases in the Pacific Ocean and the maintene.nce'there of defense 
fforces, togetherl·With recenttcharges on the part of''leaders of'"' 
the Republican party concerning the political ineptitude of' ·the: 
Far East policy of' the ~uman Administration have served to a 
c-onsiderable degree in forcing an evaluation of-American FS..rl 
Easttpolioy in general and a consideration, specifically, of''. 
the role of' the Republican party in shaping~hat policy. 
It'.:.is, therefore, the purpose of'~ this thesis to determine 
the consistency of' that policy, if' any consistent policy exists, 
Which the Republican party maintains towards the F'ar East... Itt 
is the purpose of' this thesis to show the areas in Which with 
respecttto Far Eastern af'f'airs, the Republican party was primari-
ly interested and to at.tempt.-tto .def'il!leS tb some e.x:ten.tt the limits : 
of:R~publican participation in formulating foreign policy in the 
FS.r~East. •. Tn:e limits of'~Re.publioan part.y-'participation in f'ormu-
lating;f'oreign policy in the Far East are several. In evaluating 
any specific event., the policy of' a Republican party must be con-
sidered·separat.e from the policy of' a Republican administration, 
:f'br the Republican administration represents only a small portion 
of'"the R0publioan party,; Tfie convictions of' individual members 
of' the Republican party mustt be considered separate:: from the con-
victions of' ·the Republican party. Ot.her2 limitations in determin ... 
ing~;Rapublioan party participation in formulating Far East policy 
are sectional interests and vested interests of' states and:individ~ 
e.iL. dd.vergent",,g!'oups..;. These limitations will serve tt some deg~ee 
w contradict'.: a basic-: contention:_inAmerican politics -the:.conten-
ti.on that·L.in: aa.l instances:> off contl.io:.t.tJdlietween; th'e Republican. and: 
Jlemocratic~ part;Vj• the majority partyyin power.. should supportt the.-
administration in power~ While the minority party opposes the ad-
ministration in power. It. is the purpose of this thesis tt point 
up the united:and disunited:'action taken by·.Republican··adti:d.nistra-
tion!IJ and.· by·.•members of the RepublJ.ioan~ party~: on issues invol vingo; 
the f6r.mulation of·a Far East policy. 
The method:jof'investigation has beendetermined by the 
nature of the subjeot~matter, so that the primary source materi-
ala inoiudeB the-OOngressional Record; the Hearings of the Senate. 
Cl"bmmitt-eeson. lil>reign Relations and the HOuse 08mmittEm on FOreign 
Affairs, the Senate 08ntmittee;onTerritories and.Insular Affairs, 
and reports of the New York Tlmes. These;sources·have seemea) 
from an ob.jective and. statistical point;:of view, the most authori-
tati ve.::and · comprehensive;; TE.e 'period chosen for this investigat;iion;: 
in order to adequately o:omprehend6. the work ofrthe adrilinistrations 
of the two political parties and at the same time,to provide a 
means of· contrastt b'etween D:emocratic·: and :'Republican policies, is 
the twenty-f'i ve y~arr period:.: from 1920 tb 1945,., 
Three events in.United States foreign relations have been 
taken as beingdireotly and indirectly responsible for certain-) 
aspects of Far East':polioy. These events, the dispute over the 
Shantung~peninsula, the debates over the Fhilippine .. Independence 
Bill, and the discussions over United Stiates naval policy, of· 
Which the London Naval COnference of"l9;o formed a part, have-:: 
been see'tl as a distinottinfluenoe on UnitedtStie.tes relations 
in the ~ar East~ Tlie Open Doorrpolioy and the policies of the 
Republican administrations of Raosevelttand Taft serve.as back-
gr.ound·-for the discussion .since the Republican party was first . 
to associate itselff With J.llar:Eastern .. af.fairs li:etween the.;y"'ars:: 
190~1914. 
1 
~Is THE OIEN DOOR 
A~. Iiibleri tance3 off the Repuli-lio:an·: Party:;.: 
The agrarian: interestt. 
P!Or!·a ciearerrinsight into0the e:f'f'ects o:f' the domestic issues 
~m f'6reign policy, it is importanttto further::: point out here the 
makeup o:f' the Rapub[ican party. The RSpublioan party had, by 1896, 
a large agrarian Wing;and a compromise was always necessary within·. 
tlb.e party to obtain the support·~.o:f' that Wing ;f'or general policies, 
particularly those involving:_:;military and naval supremacy of'' the.: 
United S-tates. BY 1896 (during the MoXinley campaign) itt became 
evident that without the support o:f' the far West the Republicans 
aould not hope to regain control o:f' the :f'edera~ government~ I~ 
seemed at that ':time that no radical change.:in the strategy seemed 
possible W~ich could win back the support.of' the silver producers 
in;the mountain states and the discontented :farmers in the lrorth-
2 
We~have, then, ~upposedly three interests, the farmers, 
the businessmen, and the silver producers in the Republican con-
trolled administr.ation. from 1897-1912. Ittcannot be said that 
the Republican party·'represented gl'oups o:f' individuals interested-
merely in trade investments; :for the agx:arian;group was interest~ 
2 
Ar.thurrEOloombe, 'rli.e Political Parties o:f' T8day, New Yorks 
Harper and Brothers Publishers, 1924, p. 2)1. 
edJ in:: trade :in.·terms of markets for their produce. 
Na~onal Party platforms, 19o4-1914 
- Ift~the Tfiirteenth National Oonvention:: o:rr June: 21, 19o4', att 
Ohioago, the Republicans set forth the folloWin~party platforms 
1) by our possession of.the Philippines we were enabled to take 
prompt and effective action in the relief of the leggtions ait. 
Pekingc;and a decisive part·t.in preventing ~-partition and:i preserving; 
the integrity of"Ollina, 2) the great work of connecting the Pacific 
and Atlantic by a canal was oe~• Tae platform also proposed the 
wide extension. of:- American markets, the adoption of all practicable 
methods for~the prino'iples of protection, and the maintenance of· 
'j 
a navy powerful enough to uphold the M:mroe DOctrine. There_was 
out one reference3to Ohina.. This is the only concern the of'flcial 
pulilio:; platform has With :f"'reign policy. There.: was ;no positive 
s-tatementt on.!aey.;F!arxES.stern-:policy, ( it·>mightthave:baen implied), 
in.1the national party·; platform for the years, 19o4-1912. 
;> 
Kirk lH Porter; National Party·_, Platfor:tnB, New Yorks Miomilla:rn 
C1.bmpany, 1924, p. 260 :e:r~" 
•• 
I 
i m. FB.1rES.stt Policies of'rR1:losevel"i#tan.d<TB..ftt 
i 
I 
The basic:! principles of' the Openi JJoor:· 
I BY:v 1898:'.the _ Uiii ted Sliates :f¥l.d:~ become;: a g~owing power; and5 by:,· 
! 
1899 the:. Utii-t.eddtfiates was conf'~onted:'wi th -a situation:: in. which> 
I 
she had to acttto reaff'irm herc.Bolioy in. order~ to retain'l0hina 1s3 
. I 
economic~ and political independ~noe~ Jllhw ffii.y ,, S~o:retary of': Stat'e, 
i 
made the f-ollowing af'-f'irmation11 11) thatt.the powers havin~ ",spheres;; 
of' ·influence 0 in·, Ofiina ought·· no~ tt> interfere with any tre~tw: portt 
I 
I 
Which happened to be wi thin1 tha-t;, sphere: so thai# tall na-t. ions mightt, 
I 
i 
tt-ad:e::equally .and·i freely,, 2) th~t the duties; collected within any 
I 
sphere should;' lie f'ix:edr: b'yJthe r.gular:cO]tina tari:fff" and not by; 
. I 
Eilropeans:.;Who heldcthe sphere., [The policies of the 'Oilited3S:t.ates 
i 
i 
t'owards the FS.rt· Eastt oan. be di videck. into f'ourt basia: principles. 
i 
Th:e-:;f'.irst is the Open D0orr (189~19;8); the secondl the in.tegritw 
I 
I 
of"Ohina (1922); the third, non~inter~ention·an.d nonrecognition-. 
I 
o~Japanese interests or the pa~amouncy of Japanese aggressions 
. I 
I 
(m-y-au ts note of' 1915, Stiimson·Iis of' 19;1 and thee President 1 s 
policy-statement ot·necember 1~5); and the fourth, collective 
I . 
security or the codification o~ the Open. Door (Washingto~!OOnf'erence 
I 
of 1922). The contradictory e1ementa>in the United S"bates 1 policies 










tbJ&, tJhi. ted:' t:a.ates:l policy and6 int.restt was sub'ordinat-&~ to those' of 
i 
Greatt Britain·· in her: relations with Ob.inao This , perhaps, .was 
I 
one ·reasonl whyythes Utiited:~ 5tates~olicy;.'vascillat-ed: between· a con.;. 
I 
I 
tradiOctiom of£ invol vement·t and~~ ab,Btention} positive action: or a 
I 
more negative inaction• 
I 
i 
M.tno time had·:the Americans~: been·.willing to :f'ighttfor the 
. i 
OpenJJoor policyo The moral as~ect·~.which~distinguished the. ·United: 
i 
S~ates polioyyhad long omittedf~b.e idea that·L..!!!:.!r was_, orL everr o-ould:l 
: 
I 
lie,; a practical tool of its pol~CY'fo Tiqs hade' b'een a policy llhich 
! 
both the m,publicam and D.emocratia:: administrations hadd oonti.nuous-
i 
ly upheld:::. The basic conflictt ~etween1 the political irrespon-sil:Xility/ 
i 
offthe Ad.Iilinistration and the eilcouragementtofr economia:: investtnentt 
i 
in·"lcarrying out the tenets of the Open Door, the integrity or·- China 
. I 
was still evidenttby.l912 when.besident Taft maintained that the 
i 
purpose of the Administration w~s to encourage the use off American 
The Administration did nott capital in the development of" china. 
1 
want to protectt American investfents With military power. 
I 
HOwever, Wilson did not we.nt·~to pursue the Open Door at the 
I 
! 
expense of the -independence of/Oliina. Buttby 1918, When he haciltt> 
I 
revert-.a~in. to the idea of th~ consortium, and when he had to in-
- I 
vite the American bankers to p~rtioipate in a loan, tp place :some~ 
off theirx· war:tprofits at the disposal of Oliina lesttJapan::: b.ec.ome 
sole creditor,·to Ohina, the Wilson;.Administration.was then placed: 
in·a position where the United States had to give.her investors 
4; 
more than diplomatic support~ 
Thus by 1920, the United States policy needed a clarification 
of its relationships with Japan and Ohina. The commercial interestt 
still existed but the political climate had changed and was still 
changing .. 
Japan challenges the Open mJor principles:· 
t!Wi th :the ac:quisi tion. of the Hl.ilippines the United~ States 
had·~~ •stumbled t into world politics under the Republican Administra-
5 
tions. 11 Tlle .United States had forced Japan to abandon her long: 
established policy of seeking national seouri ty by avoiding,inter-
national relations; Japan and the United States had enjoyed fifty 
years of friendshipe It was after the Treaty of ibrtsmouth:that 
Japanese-Amer~can relations took a turn for the worsee Tlie rea-
son:' for Roosevelt • s interferencec and the motive in stopping the 
war of 1905, one would assume, was that he did not want RUssia 
to be driven completely outcof Eastern Asia, but rather desired· .... 
to keep her1 im Asia, for he believed in the balance of power·• 
Randolph Ad8JD1J' A History of the F'.breign Policy of the United States, 
New Yorks The Macmillan Oompany, 1926, p. ~34·~ 
55 
Stanley Ke Hornbeck, O.Ontemporary Politics in the Fa.r1·East, 
New Yorks ~ Appleton and Oompany, 1918, p. 2~1 .. 
-~-
murthermore, ROosevel~ had defini~e reserva~ions as ~o how far1he 
could support the Japanese. ~\evelt replied accordingly to ~he 
(£ 
a~taok by Reinsch and Kennan on'1 ~he Tl'ea~y of~ Portsmouths 11I 
acted at the ~ime I did at the wri~ten.request1.of the Japanese., • ., 
I explained that she wouldc:not ge~·i.an indemnity and she asked·~ me. 
~o bring abbut ~he peace meeting with full knowledgeeof ~he faott 
that in my opinion she neither deserved·.:not would get an~ indemn.i ~y., ~ .. 11 
RGosevelt was perhaps successful in ~he Far Eas~ because he hadj 
prec-eeded his policy,·with whatt amo'Lttl~ed to a declara~ion 11that he 
c:ould be co'Lttl~ed" upon t"b aid· in preserving:.:;~he peace of Europe and:' 
~ha~ he would come ~o ~he aid of Japan': in case a third power joined 
Russia. President".:.Reosevelt (in: effeo~] ••• had made .the American 
- . ~ 
gQvernmen~ an unsigned .·member of ~he Anglo-Japanese alliance. n 
BUtt 'f"fl.ftt. had no~ followed ~he BOosevel~ program, Which was 
the abandonmen~ of ~he Open Door in turn for Japanese friendship; 
for the TAft years were ones in Which American capital was seeking, 
more so than in ~he Roosevel~ years, foreign outlets, and in·p~ 
suing ~heir neutralization plans and loan plans, both T~t and Knox: 
were unaware of the implications of either the Anglo~Japanese 
alliance ot the Russo-Japanese alliance., With the Roosevelt policy, 
7 
Reinsch was Minister Plenipotentiary to Oliina from 1901-06, and~ 
Kennan-.Y.Was a world-wide traveler and journalist who reporled 
the Russo-Japanese war of 1905. 
Tfler Dennet~1 ROosevelt and the Russo-Japanese War, New Yorke 
DBuble, Page and Company, 1925, p., 282., 
a~ 
Ibid., P• !)17. 
7f 
J:apa.m had,' counted. uporuthe supporttof' the::: United:: States for the::: 
Japanese policy in Manchuria im 1906~10.. Tl'l.is supponti. S&cretaey 
KnoX:, was not Willing to give, forrthe Kno:xx neutralization: plan was 
put',f'orwe.rd f'or1the purpose of' blocking.::;Je.pe.nese aggression in 
Manchuria Which was e. repudiation-of' the Roosevelt policy. The 
principle effect of' Knox's plan to intervene in·~ Manchuria was, then, 
to throw together Russia and Japan, so lately enemies, in e. mutual 
defense of their respective spheres of''inf'luence. In e. somewhat"'_ 
naive e.nd simple way Secretar,y Xnox~he.d put forward the proposition 
that the theory of' the Opendlleoro l:ie reduceck tb practise in:. Manchuria. 
By 1910 the difference ~tween~Knox<and Roosevelt policies was thiss 
Knox was willing to sacrifice Japanese friendship for the sake of 
protecting Ohinese~e.nd American interests, and Roosevelt objected 
strongly to any policy Which would :b'ringge. ne.tion1 to e. choice lie-
tween .fighting::;or not-:.fightingJ,When:there was no intentiom what~ 
ever of' fighting~ Whereas R8osevelt interpreted the Open Ddor as 
first political expediency and secondly as economic necessity, 
Tli.ft':emphe.sized rather the importance of the economic aspects of': 
the Open Door. BUt R6osevelt .in using cooperative action to pre-
serve Chine. did not realize how greatly the balance of power.! fon· 
9 
Dennett, Q.R• ill·, p .. ;2o. 
9 
Which-: he had,., striven . in· 1905 was shif'ting., 
Wllatt.then was Roosevelt's contribution to the Fia.r"·Eastern 
policy of the United States'l Since the E'Liropean powers have been 
natural obstacles to American commercial interests in the Far East-~ 
and the European powers have always wanted to partitiom OH.ina, the 
United'States, because of its geographi~location, could only otTer 
its good Will. And since Rttssia had to be dislodged, and America 
would nottuse any force, ROosevelt·,_:was prepared to help Japan as 
long as Japan was fightingthe battle of the United States in 
Manchuria.,. Japan may have exhausted hersel£'f With continual fight-
ing:-:-but weakening the Far East by weakening Japan in this way, 
~ 
Would not b'enefit~.the historical policies ofcthe United, States. 
HOw,::was this policy representative of the Republican interest? 
One can assume that it probabl~ was not fully representative of 
the Republican policy at all., Tie policy of 1905 and after in: 
the Roosevelt Administration:was ROosevelt~~poiicy alone. He made 
fUll use of his executive agreement power, and the policy never 
had; the expressssanction: of either the Senate or the House. The 
initiative, then, was entirely 11 RBoseveltianP_. 
AS. a matter of polioy·the Administration, between the years 
from about 1905-1914 sought in the Far Etst not deliberate exploita-
tion but rather diplomatio:;oooperation with other powers having 
interests in the Far East. 
Opposition t~ naval expansion 
Tha suc-o-ess of' ~osevelt 1 s 1big navy:~ program:, specifically, 
and his F!e.rrEasttpolicy in general, can bestt be considered with a 
more detailed analysis of the naval appropriations bill. The 
cleliates on the blilg navy program were carried over into the !B.f.tt. 
administration also. 
I1b 1899 Ma.hs.n.r s v-iews,; of the Open Door and cooperation: With 
Gl-eati.:Bri:tain were expressed im Problems o~ Asia. In. 1909 the.: 
M6ody-Dayton~Ma.ha.n committee sent' .. to Oongress a possible plan· 
for naval organization, f6r since 1902 Me.han:had urged the appoint ... 
. 10 
ment:.of'trained officers on the Naval Beard. Attany rate, 
BQosevelt as early as 1905, with the coming of the Japanese crisis, 
proposed construction of four battleships in place:::-of the traditiion-
al one. N'o matter how much public opinion was for naval expat?-sion, 
and no matter· how much pressure was put on OOngress bY exporters 
and shipbUilders, year after year.there was g!'eat oppositionfrom 
both parties in·; Oongress and within the Senate Naval QQ.mmi ttee 
and the Oommittee orrAfpropriations to the expansion of the Wavy. 
A:'ln·ief' consideration of the tone of the speeches of the members 
of COngress and tabulation of the 1vote 1 on the Naval Appropriations 
10:: 
oa.ptainJ W. D~ Puleston, Lif.9 and Work of Oaptain Alfred Thayer. 
Mahan, USWI Yale University Press, 19;9, p. ;04. 
.ll.7i' 
B!l.ll Will point. :up the sectional interests in O:Ongress. 
Il!i 1905, _opposition, to naval expansion .came from:Representa-
· t'i ve JJ G:i OAnno:n- (Illinois), Ollairman of the Oommi ttee on; Appropri-
ations, Senator Eugene Hale (Maine), OHairman of the Senate.Naval 
Committee, Representatlive T~ E. BUrton. (Ohio), Republican, and~ 
RBpresentati ve Claude; Ki tohen~ (North OS.rolina), Ilemocrat-e The:o 
--
HOuse voted down the first proposal (199 to 8') and the Senate, 
Which represented both small navy and big:,naV'iV Republicans and' 
Democrats, voted down the proposal, too. The next year, the Naval 
Appropriations Bill was again liefore the House of~Representatives 
and the following is a sampling of the speeches. They indicate 
the general view of the House toward the naval establishment as 
it existed then. 
Tfte varying opinions expressed on naval expansion 
BUrton- of Ohio$ *'Aeoording:~to the report .filed here, the 
-Navy lacks 5,500 men. W~ether it is because the genius of our 
people is not such that young men desire :to enlist·; in the Navy ••• 
we are maintaining construction altogether out of proportion with 
1(1. 
the essential service of manning the boats. 11 
-
nwney of 'Minnesotas 11 Under their policy [the Administration] 
the size of our Navy is to be determined relatively by the size 
11 
59 (1), Congressional Record, p. 6958, May 16, 1906~ 
of'~·the navies ;of' other: countries regardless ·of our; ownrneoessity .... 
TEie policy implies a total disregard of necessity or;expense and· 
that, like childre.n ••• we must compete with nations e.. to satisfY 
:D2 
our national pride. tl There remained two things to do• (1) either-
commence to curtail the expenditures in preparation for war or·. 
(2) increase the taxes. 
Ba.rtholdttof' Missouris uif that move succeeds, if there Will 
be an agreement at the Hague this fall in favor of international 
arbitration ••• the battleships will become Wholly unnecessary ••• 1' Tl!iey Will be thrown in the junkshop. 11 Representative Bardholdt 
continued that he abhorred destruction hut would vote for the 
appropriation because the men who were responsible for our govern-
men-t were the bestt judges as to what we needed. 
In this debate Representative Gillespie advanced the point 
of view of the farmer, saying, 11Where is the committee of this 
House that takes care of the interests of agriculture in the way 
of securing oheapercinstruments and tools, lower taxation, some~ 
thing that is a positive and direct effect on the American farmer.'1 
t!bckran of New Y·ork• 11_Tfie surrender of authority by a member 
of this House into the hands of any other person ••• is an evasion 
of duty .... Does anybody believe that force can play a part in·· 
]2 
59 (1), Obngressional Record, p. 6959, May, 1906. 1' Ibid .. , p. 6961. 
1~--
Ioid!., p. 6972. 
peaceful oomm.eroef" 
Gillettt or:· OaUfornias "We ask memlier.s of· the Hb.use .... tto] ~v;e __ 
our: meoha.ni.Cs:"a.nd le.botrers om the c:oast-c e.:.cha.riaa to· g~tt· e. jph, •••• 
We haw:. onl~J two vessells on1 the coast~ l:ieilmg constructed, e.{¥lii:!Stt 
. 16 
;$now :l:>ainlg_~ constructed. itl1 the Easti;.. ". · 
... 
Bt:,r 190lft "\ihe poll. tice.r. im.plice.tillms seemedi to d:eno:t.e that the . 
Amerloa.m public iro ge:riere.il opposed: e. b:tg:;navy, e.long_;with:the 
middle west"; e. natural st'.ronghOldl of- anti.-.Na:vy::: s.entimentt.. T.fl:e 
financiers (O~magie, f'or example) and the business interests 
were not too:: plee.sed.i with the big:; Navy progrBL Mr .. Hale, Oaair ... 
ma.n o:F the Senate O:Ommi i"bee oro N"ave.l Affairs, reoei ved·i as great 
numlier of petitions from groups of solilDoL teachers and groups 
17 
of the clergy;who. expresse~ dislike~of the expanding navy progr~ 
Del:ia.te continued itt! the House. A Sampling of the views ex ... 
pressed during this debate follows. 
MbXi.nil.ey of Oaliforniu ~In the distric-t the:tc. I:: hav;e the 
honor to represent, there are'-'a great·:me.:ny who are en~<g~di inl the 
coast-wise trade of the United Stattes ••• I l:ieliev..e ••• that the time 
has come when1 it is neoessa:ry; that· the Pacific OCean shall hav.e 82 
sq~dron of' batt-leships~ •• as that __ mai.ntaiDed:i om the A.lt.lantic •• ., 
when we were fortuitously situated i.n1 regardi to 9ttJ opportunity 
15-) 
59 (1), ,Oongressional Record, p .. 8'974, May 16, 1906. 
16 . -. . 
. lPJ:!.' p .. 6986. 
17 
-,21> .. EJ:1., 60 (1) 1 Oo.sr~~sional Record, p. 126$, January 28, 1908 .. 
18 
· 'to secure :f""oreigm 'trade and commerce ••• ~ . 
... 
Xnowland. of OB.liforniu ~-Im vo-tin-g for am. adequate N"avw your 
repr~senta'tive i:m OOngress fro~ 'the Ear West has always regarded.' 
tha-t N"e:vy as national, b:elievinlg that-:- the Pacific seaboard had 
just as much share iro it and fully a.s much right to i't as the 
19 
coast bordering; on: the Atiautic Oeee.n. 1~ 
Partisan and Sectional Interests* 
Beth the coast and interior Republicans were divided. om the 
program. Speaker> of the House Oe.nn!'n· wu opposed and Representa~ 
tive Foss of the Naval OOmmittee and ~pr~eentative Tawney of' the 
,, 
Appropriations Committees were by now: (1908). lukewarm· in: favor o1! 
inc~asing· the size of the naval establishment~ Therefore,- acc-ord.-. 
ing to the vote fr~ '0 representative atate interests, 0~-of 
eight representatives from the coast, seven endorsed the program; 
while out of fourteen representatives from the interior only seven 
endorsed the program. Those for a large%'2. Navy included seven Demo-
orate, eight Republicans; those for acsmallerlra~inoluded eight 
Democrats, seven Republicans. The vote appears to be ~te evenly 
divided. On:e can assume, the, from-. a small representatiom of the 
states that' the Republican; party as im the Rouse, at least,· Wa'EI 
not in favor of the big Navy and was not Whole-heartedly backing the 
! 
See nt:~te Nb.. 20 for the breakdown of'· states and represeutati ves. 
18 
60 (1), Congressional Reco~~ p. 4,96, AprilLlO, 190~ 
19 ... 
Ibid., P• 4598. 
~ 
Republica.m Adminttstre:tlion. And perhaps the President 'ts continual 
demands om Oongress and continual pursuit of' J±is own; polloy solid-
20 
if'ied the opposi tio1r1 to a pointt where it could nut;:. 1:ie c:ompromised .. 
'l'~tJ f'act remains, however, that;. Roosevelt's ·11big -stickn idees, 
carried over into the Naval Appropriations.; ProgrBJm of' the Taf't 
Administration; was partially suocressf'Ul, f'or Ol>ngress did nott 
out the naval appropriation, but rather increased it by 60 milliom 
20 
Sprout and Sprout, The Rise of'- American N"'e.val Power:" Princeton 
University P.ress,. .19.~9, p., 265:££. 
mar a larger.·NSYys seven Democrats; eight Republicans .. 
D. Favot La. 
R•. McKinley Oalif'. 
R. Know land Oalif',. 
D .. HObson Ala .. 
D. otoonnell Ma.ss .. 
D .. croekran1 N .. Ye 
D .. Richardson Ala .. 
R. Humphrey Wash .. 
R., Fassett N.Y., 
D. Robinson Ark. 
R. Hayes oau:r. 
R .. Parker N.J. 
;a .. Landis Ind. 
R .. Lonporth Ohio 
D,i Talbott· Nd .. 
For a SMALLERiNAVYa eight Democrats; sev~n Republicans. 
R. Foss Ill. 
D.,. Padgett Tenn. 
. ~ Bartltoldt MO. 
D., Gregg Texas 
R. BUrton·: Ohio 
D. :Kitchen N.,O .. 
R. Laud Mi..oh·. 
D.., Rainey Ill. 
D. Williams Hb. 
R. Tawney Minn. 
D. Lassitert w. Via.. 
R • Keifer Qhio D. :Macon~ Ark. 
R. Fuller Ill. 
D. Watkin'S. La. 
dollars, and the Democratic HQuse of' 1912, Wliil.e opposing;; iro debate 
21 
'the battleship prog~, bad voted, according to the lraEWYea~ook 
of 191!.71 the lal'lgestt appropriation:~ iln American~ his~ry to that,. dat-e., 
:Meanwhile, '!lJB:'D:3'J c~s had taken: place Withinl the American· 
political system9 President Ta:f.ft and Secretary XlJox< had seem their 
aggressiQ efforts to 'Protect Americans im the Far: East :F.rustra:tech 
by Japan and Russia. Tlii.s policy if carried out would hawe needed 
naval backing., The tar.~ strugg~e ultimately ruillsd: the solid-
aritY:; otr the RBpublioSJil part~ so thatt iro the eleotioro of 1910, 
Whicli: was directei~' againSt:, the so ... calJ.e~, Wall Street. init:.erests, 
the HOuse r.eturnedl with a Democratic majority. Under these conditions 
the Navy program became the pawm. of partisam politics. 
The toile of the 00ngre1Jsioal debates changed:i also. There 
was much talk of war and a:oomnparison:of Germa.m end. Japanese naval 
appropriations with: those of the UnJUt,ed·· States. The Democrats llX)W 
claimed that the Republioa.:m part}7 had noc priori'tYJ o:ro receivilmg 
all the credit for building a large lfa~, for they tried.to claim 
22 
partial~credit, also., 
The 1906-1910 debates are not atlall concerned with the talk 
of the tlireatt of war:, as were the debates of 191D-1912. It iB 
interesting to note the lack of unity and co:n:f'usiOJ:Xl of miJ1d; of the 
21 
Sprout and Sprout, P• 289. 22 . 
Oongeessional Record, pp., 705,~7061, May 2,, 1912. 
House im t.he first/~period.. Mbstt were~'c(mcernedwit.h the dearth 
of young men who were eager~ for careers in t.he Navy, the fact,t that,·;: 
perhaps the Unit.ed St,at,es would be in oompet.it.:Lon.with other powers,_. 
the cost. of maintaining a larger establishment, the quest.ion of" 
t.he actual :Med--3 off a.ey·.sizable navy, and the question·"whet.her t.he · 
public~ wanted a larger Navy •. West coasttspokesman. saw the need:'· 
for a Pacific squadron<1--- buttalso argp.ed for:·a largerr·Nia.~Jim 
order t.o create work for idle mechanics. Ag~icultural int.erests 
were against a larger :tfavy,e. EYen?financial and purely commercial 
int.erests were not. complet.ely for the expansion programQ 
Tfte·;tradi t.ional partisan and sectional interests ile~~.,sttS.i\t • 
ev·ident.. The sea-board Republicans, for; t.he interior Republicans, 
ag~;inst.J. t.he interior Democrat.s, against.; t.he -sea-board Democrats, 
divided~ This cleavage was not strictly partisan. The At.lant.ic 
sea-bbard~had always claimed a vested interest in the fleet.. Tlie 
Democrats were determined even if in agreement to discredit t.he 
Rapublioan President. The presence of a fleet. in t.he Pacific was 
important and would have st.rengthened the Taft policy in t.he Far 
East.~. It was too much of a risk to press for all out support by" 
t.he Republican party of a program which would injure the Eastern. 
sea-board int.erest.s. 
Tlie naval appropriat.ions debate is an isolated example of· 
Republican support·. The debates of' the House, perhaps, are nott 
representative of' opinion as would be the Senate which exercised 
a more powerful control over foreign affairs iri this early period. 
There is evidence enough f'rom this example that the idea of' the 
bag~avy to support the commercial escapades of' the Republiaarn 
Administration in the Far Easttare n·ottgerma.ne to the policies 
of' the Republican party. To recapitulate, there was opposition 
from both parties in supporting the program and both parties laid 
o~aim to the traditional policy of' supporting a big Navy. 
O:mA.PrERi:U:Is THE OPEN DOOR REDEFINED, 1919-1922 
Ai Introduotionc: 
The isolated example of the debates on the naval appropri-
ations bill served to illustrate in"a small way the limitations 
of a Republican administration to' influence the formulation of' 
a policy Which would directly benefit one particular interest. 
The Roosevelt initiative in promoting the Open Door policy and~ 
the ROosevelt proposal for a big Navy did not receive the united 
acceptance of the Republican party. Tl:ie sectional interests of" 
the non sea-coast representatives in;Oongress, both Republican 
and Democratic, prevente~a~,such united action. 
This chapter Which continues the discussion of certain new 
aspects of the Open,DOor policy from 1919 to 1922 Will serve both 
t'b contrast with the earlier period;, of the Open:,Door, under the 
Republican administrations and Will serve to illustrate another 
limitation of Re.publioan participation in formulating foreign 
policy in the Far East •. Tfiis chapter serves to illustrate the 
split within the ranks of the Republioan.party as a result of 
traditional principle or as a result of personal conviction. 
THe Shantung question of the Treaty of Peace with Germany and the 
Washington ·Oanference of 1922 represent two debates in Congress 
in which with respect to Far Eastern affairs, the Republican 
party should have been interested. 
m.. Tl'l.e SH.ani:.ung .. Question1 
'!'lie issues ·involvedi the T:teaty with~ Germany 
The first world war left the United States with the task o~-
leading the negotiations for i:.he Treaty With Germany. It was the 
Democratic Administration of Wilson Which had prepared to challenge 
Japan ts position in the FS.:r Eastt Wi1lson insisted not only on the 
I 
resi:.orai:.ion of Shantung,_to ·China but. also on i:.he principles of-
aolleci:.ive security in1ES:stern:Asia. T'lie firstttwo steps Which 
constituted a challenge to Japan 1s influence in~Asia were the newly:,r 
organized~:f6ur power consortium which set up financial investments 
il'rt China, and the Allied military exped'i tion ~to Sib'eria' Which were:· 
to neutralize Japanese troops stationed there. Tlie Peace Confer-
ence, Wilson assumed, would codify the principles of the Far;Ea:stel'Ill 
policy of the Unii:.ed States.. T:lie strategic territory of the Shan-
ttmg peninsula and port of Kiao-CHou, which had been d:ed:ed:_; i:.o 
Germany March:6i 1898, was inl919, in:Japan1s possession; and: 
the delegates t'Q i:.he peace conference were conf'ronted·.with the. 
question as to whether the provisions of the Tfeaty with Germany 
should make legal Japan's claim to Shantung. The United States 
Senai:.e in approving the treaty would determine subsequent treaty 
stipulations concerning Far Eastern policy.. Tne Senat.e was no~0 
merely confronted with future long-range policy. 
The treaty stipulations With Germany Would possibly repudiate 
previous policy agreements. Tlle La.using.oo:Ishii Agreemeut~concluded· 
in-1917 recognised that Japan had special interests in~Cliiue., pe.rti-
~ule.rly contiguous to those parts in Which she had possessions. Jape.~ 
had managed to o bte.in from- the United S-t;ates e. direct coutrov.ersion 
of the policy inaugurated in· the Rijot-Take.hire. A~eement. T~ougn 
the Root-Tii:kahire. Agreement affirmed:the Open Door policy and safe-
ggarded Oliina's territbrie.l integrity, the La.nsin~Ishii notes re• 
cogpized Japan's special interests firsttaud the,Open·Door doctrine 
second. Tie interpretation and the validity of the La.nsing-Ishii 
A&r.eement caused much anxiety e.monggthe Senate investigators before 
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Hearings on the Treaty of 
1 . 
Peace with Germany. SSQretary of State Lansing testified thatt 
it was understood that Japan would return Kiao-Ohou to Chine. When · 
2<:-
the Ag~eement was made. 
Attitudes of the United States and Chinese delegations 
~reover, the Senate was faced with consideration of the United 
States' moral responsibility toward Chine.. ·President Wilson and 
Secretary Lansing had warned against any outright declaration of 
ll. 
New York Times, August 22, 1919, p. 2J2, Of. United States Senate 
Fi>reign· Relations O:Ommi ttee, Hearings on the T'ree.ty of: Peace 
With Germany, 66th Congress, 1st session, July 1919, PP• 216~18. 
22 
Tl!iere was e. secret treaty in January 1917 between Japan and G.i'eat·: 
Britain in which Great Britain promised to support Japanese 
claims to ~rman possessions at the Peace Conference. Japan' 
had also made au agreement with Russia in 1916 in which Japan 
promised not to let China fall under the domination of any 
third power. 
wari'·aga;inst ~rma.ny on:· .. the part of Cliina. Declaration of war, 
Lansing argued, would plunge,Oliina into civil strife; and yet, 
Ambaesador!Reinsoh argued, that without United States interestt. 
and help, Ciiina would be driven to takecJapan 1s help. Despite.: 
the two conflicting'-~diploma.oies:;Cfiina was brought into· the war •. 
Althougl! W:L'lson, as latter evidenced by his..;aotions at",·.the Peace 
Ohina, it was significant that the Cliinese delegatee at the Peace 
Canference should appeal both to President Wilson and the American 
' Senate., 
TH.e contention·of both the Shantung delegates to the assembly, 
D~. H~ K. Kung and Dr. Tl H. HSu was certainly a valid onet Iff 
Japan controlled the Shantung ~eninsula it would dominate northern 
China. Tlioma.s F~ Millard, special advisor to Cfiina, testified be-
f6re the Fo·reign: Relations Ccimmi..ttee that the American. e~perts on 
Oriental affairs at the Peace C6nference were all agreed that the 
4~ 
Shantung odecision would breedwYa:r., And John: 00. Ferguson, another 
advisor to CHina, continued the testimony before the Commit~ee with 
the statement that China was advised by the United States that her 
declaration of war annulled Japan's claim on the German holdings 
5:J 
in1 OlUna. When, in.August, then, the Senate was considering the e . 
'~: 
New York Times, May 11, 1919, p .. 6:1, and June 29, 1919, p. '''· 
4 
United States Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Hearings on the 
Tteaty of Peace with Germany, 66th Congress, ist session, 
August, 1919, pp. 4,7 ff. 
55 
Ibid., pp. 557 ff~ 
Ishii stated that Japan took possession of Kiao-Chou in.l914 
by force of arms when China was still neutral. New York Times, 
May 16, 1919, p. 4s,. 
(J:ime::29, 1919). 
Theecieo-is iom ofi" the Sana te 
President 1 Wilson:• s ina 'Pili ty to maintain: Ohiila 1 a te:rtri to rial 
rights at the·2l'eace ClQnferenoe,, and according t"b Lansing::his3 
11c:omplete surrender to JapanP. was not wholly his error.!4i Thee: 
otherx·Allied powers were content to acoept~c:the secrett tt-eatttea .. 
they had made llith 'l'Ok;ro, :f'Dr they considered Ohina 1s c:ontril:iu-
tiion-;to the war as neg;J;ig;b1e. Oh.ina, herself; meanwhile., hadd 
a:onciud·edd a treat;r with Japan·J also., (1918) Th'e :::Chinese:: Gbvernmentt 
had:1ac:ceptedc paymentton~ a~·Jape.nese railway loan. In turm Ohine£ 
m-anted.:: economi~ privileg_~s to Japan imShantung~ · Ittwas Japan 1s 
ii:ttentiomto exacttfronn Ohinac.as many rd.gh.ts and privileg~ru as.::; 
possib1e liefbre relii:tquishin-g.£Sliantungj, ande Ohina realizing,;hen.-
position::in1the Fa.r:o:East·~was trying;~ ma.k:e the United States her 
mediator. Hbwever, Wilson;ta g1;eatest~ obstacle to the achievementt 
_s_: 
of his Far.Eastern policy, was the United: States Senate. OSrtain:: 
T' 
members of the Senate, known as the n_irreconcilables 11 , hadi 
65 
Wi:lson·l s policy in the Fti.rc East was a departure from the T.B.ttt 
policy-_. He stated at the beginning of his Presidential 
term of office that he· would take all fair means .off pro-
moting:;Am.erice.n trade ill' Ohina (consortium) but would con-
tinue to stand for the Open Door. The Shantung surrender1 
however, was a 'VIliidlatii.on: o~ his ooriginal policy statement. 
71 
Tlie 11irreooncilables 0 were those members of the Senate who were 
opposed to the League of Nations in its entirety, even With 
reservations. 
seized. upon: 1iheeShan1iung:~ ques1iiom as one reason:. fOr re j ect.ing_; 
1ihe .League and 1ihe; 'Versailles Treat.y.,. The whole confusion over 1ihe 
Shantung affair comoined with the Al~ied open sympathy tbwards 
Japan was used by opponents t-'o the League in·t.he -.Senate as 1ihe 
most valid reason·,:f':or keeping 1ihe Unit.ed: stat.es out of the Leagt;te.,. 
The League could not~ 1ihey asserted, be used.under these eire~ 
stances as an instrument<of an .American policy in·. the Far East • 
. The argum.ent.s stated before the Hearings of the F..Oreigm Re-
lations Oommitt.ee followed 1ihe same reasoning~ What·cgu..ara.nt.l:le:; 
has 1ihe Udi1ied St.ates that. Japan will uphold any treat.y wit.h re-
speot. to the ~ar East and will the League provisions come up 
1i'b 1ihe test·~of protecting CB.inaf 
Tl'l.e first. action:, and deliberate effort of the ~Republican-; 
majority of 1ihe Senat.e Fbreign;Relations Cdmmi1itee was denounc .... 
ed by Administra1iion~Sena1iors August. 2~rd. Tlie Senat.e 00mmi1:.1iee 
ffi 
V€)ted 9 tc 8 to amend:·· the 1ireaty returning Shantung directly 
to Cliina.,. Since Senator Lodge of Massachusett.s had proposed the 
amendment., it was assumed that. Lodge had the inten1iion of defeat.~ 
ing·the treat.y in its ent.irety., Defeat. of 1ihe treat.y was exact.ly 
ffi 
N6w York 'l'~mes,, Augu.st·:24, 1919, p. ls8. 
'l'lie Republicans voting for, were Lodge, Borah, Xnoxi Johnson, 
MOses, New, Harding, and Brandegee. Of 1ihe Democrats, 
Pittman, Shields, and Hitchcock were counted in the negative 
although absent. Senator MCCumber voted with the Democrats. 
Whatt Borah of:" Idaho, Johnson of OO.lifornia, and~: Poindexter1 of· 
Washington; (among the Republicans); Reed ·• of Missouri and GOre of 
Oklahoma had wanted. Senators felt the amendment Would mean re-
committing :the entire treaty, and :the United States in this way 
would be putting herself outside the Faris Conference negotiations. 
HOwever, opposition to the Lodge amendment was not confined-: 
to the Administration: Senators. Republican Senators, including 
some of the so-called 11mild reservationists", headed by Senator 
MCCumber of North Dakota had declared that the move to amend 
the Shantung provision would be fought with grave consequences 
on~the floor of the Senate. A bitter fight ensued on the floor 
of the Senate in which Senator ~Ctimber defended the positioxr! 
of the Shantung provisiom and Senator· Borah ridiculed Mc0liunber 1 s 
every defense of his position. 
Thec~diebate in: the .Senate on1 Senator Lodge 1 s amendment con:-
tinu~~until October, 1919. The attitudes reflected in the Senate 
are the .following. 'Various Senators on:: both sides of the Chamber:. 
Who had announced themselves as opposed to the amendment because:· 
it would recommit the treaty to the principle signatories and in-
e¥itably result, they argued, in the refusal of Great Britain, 
Erance, and Japan to agree to the change, maintained that they 
St 
N"ew York Ti:mes, August~25, 1919, p. 1:1. 
prelterred to supporttsome reservation in its stead;; In this group 
of.' Senators who maintained these ideas were Senators Lenrooti:o:f"-
Wisconsin, Colt of Rhoie Island; e.nd·'Spencer ofCMissouri, Republi-
lD 
cans, and Tliomas of Colorado, Shields of Tennessee, Democ:rats. 
All these Senators denounced the cession of the Shantung.:;pri vileges; 
b'uttargued that the United States could perform its part in.the 
matter by a mere refusal to be,bound by the treaty provision! rather 
than by going to the extent of seeking to amend the treaty. 
It ·.was significant that during the debate concerning Lodge 1 s 
amendment no one defended the underlying principles involved im 
the transfer of these formercGerm.a.n privileges to Japane Senators 
who opposed the amendment did so on the ground that, although the 
award to Japa.n.was something to which the United States could not 
agree, it was not an easy matter to lift it entirely- out of the: 
treaty. Senator Lodge in: defending his amendment, maintained 
that-ahe Germans would be glad to make a separate peace_ With the 
United States if o.ther powers did not agree to the amendmenti; and 
fUrthermore, he asserted, Europe would always be willing to accept 
the United.:States into the Lea~ue. 
&«;-,... ... •' 
Before the final vote on the Lodge amendment was taken,.m.a.ny 
preliminary proposals and arguments were put forward. One such 
ll) 
66·:(1), Congressional Record, pp. 7008 ffe 1 October 16, l919. 
Qr~ New York Times, October 16, 1919, P• 1:). 
11 
proposal was the Lenroottreservation. Uhder thia reservation 
the United States could act as it saw fit~with respect to the use 
of the economic rights on the Shantung~peninsula and reserve its 
liberty of action at all times in behalf of~~Cliina., If.-a dispute 
arose over Japan 1 s occupancy of Shantung, the Uni ted6 States Jilight 
take sides or stay neutral as the United States saw fit. In any 
event, the United States could distinctly express its refusal to 
b:e bound by the treaty provision as it was written. The Lenroot 
reservation was defeated. 
'file ro&l call votes on the Shantung amendment . 
The defeat<~. of the Shantung amendment was, in terms of 
strategy, the greatest loss to the Republican Senators. With 
the aid of fourteen Republican Senators, the Shantung amendment-:: 
was beaten, October 16th by a vote of 55 to ~5.. Tliree Democrats, 
Reed of Missouri, Gore of Oklahoma, and Walsh of Massachuset~s 
voted with Lodge for the amendmentt.. Senators Edge of New Jersey,. 
Republican, Martin of New Jersey; Smith of South Carolina, and 
12 
Johnson of California were paired against the amendment. 
For the amendment 





N·ew~:York Times, October 16, 1919,: p. 2:4,. 
12 
66 (1), Congressional Record, p. 701~, October 16, 1919. 
O:f""the fourteen Republican votes cast, four were severe disappoint-
menta to the Republican Senators$ Smoot of:::Ut.ah, COmmins of Iowa, 
Hale· of Maine arid Kenyon of Iowa. Many Rapublicans, Senator Jbhn~ 
son in particular, had counted upon them to support an _amendmentt 
which would give equality of' votes in the League Assembly. Senator 
l~? 
Johnson's amendment was also in vain ... 
Republicans, as they had indicated previously, asserted. they 
would·'support a reservation the:ttwould grantt.the privileg~ of' the: 
Utiited·:States to refuse to be bound by any action of the League in' 
d·isputes relating to Shantung. Tlie concern now was more around the 
League stipulations rather than the treaty with OOrmany • Tfiis 
reservation was favorably urged by Senators La FOllette of Wiscon-
sin, Hale of' Maine, Jones of' Washington, Sterling of South Dakota, 
14 . 
and Smith of South Carolina. 
T~e~~Shmber substitute proposal f'or the ibdge amendment was 
1.15 . ~ 
defeated by a vote of 50 to 42, Senator M60Umber and. Senator 
Nelson of'_=Minnesota, the only Republicans voting for the.substitute. 
Under that proposal the United S~ates_would refrain;f'rom entering; 
into any agreement on::that portion·:: regarding,_the Shantung provisions 
of the treaty but would have full libe;ty of' action·-. 
TJfie resolutions and substitutions did not resolve the Shantung; 
lD3 
14 
66 (1), Congressional Record, P• 7014, October 16, 1919. 
Lodge Reservation No .. 7i li_Tlliec:United St.ates withholds its assent 
to Article 156, 157, 1~8 and reserves full liberty of action 
with respect to any controversy Which may arise under said_ 
articles between the Republic::- of' China and the Empire of' Japan. 11 
1,5 
N"ew .York T':tmes, November 16, 1919, p. 2s~. 
probU.emo. Tile final t.t-eat.y defeat.·,oam.e November 20th Wh.en-:t.welve:, 
11 irreconeilab1le"- Republicans with 4~ Democrats thrice voted6 down-, 
t.he Lodge Resolution.- TB:e following was t.he rolll. call vote. 
Fer t.he Resolution:. ~9 
IR~5 
D:; 4 
A~inst.tt.he Resolut.ion1 55 
RU2 
:ro4; 
S~nat.ors Gore, ~hields, Smith and Walsh were t.he four Democrats~ 
The second defeat. of t.he Lodge Resolutions 
For t.he Resolution 41 
R,\;4h 
DD7 
A~inst.tt.he Resolution: 50 
R l~ 
Dr.;:r: 
OO·ct.he seven Democrats, in addition t.o t.he above four, there were 
Senators I>trers of' Montana, Owen of Okb.homa. and Pomerene ofr Ohio .. 
Tlies"irreconcilableu Rapublicans who were·opposed t.o all 
; 
aspects of t.he Leagge, voted on this issue, because of personal 
c:onviction and because of' t.he principles invlhlved, with t.he Demo-
orat.iccma.jority.. Tli'us, the Japanese maintained the Shantung 
peninsula, and t.he policy of t.he Unit.edSt.ates towards t.he Far 
East.t.remS.ined to be defined by t.he Senate in later treaty negot.i-
at.ions. 
16 
New York T!mes, November 20, 1919, p. 1:8~ Tile third defeat.:was 
;a t.o 5~; The vot.e on t.he ratification of the Treaty with 
GEirma.ny was 66 t.o 20. Only Republican Senators Borah and 
La Follet.t.e voted against. the treaty. 
67 (l), Congressional Record, p. 64~8, October 18, 1921. 
16 
ct. Tile Washington: Oonf'erence of 1922 
The Shantung . pro biem appears· agaim 
Of£the fbur basic~principles of the United States policy to-
wards the Far:East, the Open Door, th.e integrity of··ohina, non-
recmgnition of'Japanese interests and collective security, two 
of them, the integrity of Onina and the codification of the Open 
Door were utilized as the center of debate during the Washington: 
Oon:f'erenoe :of 1921-1922. 
Aa we have seen, the Hay notes provided the basis for de• 
fining:;Amerioan interests in' OhitUi<> .President Wilson: borrowed 
heavily from the Hay notes, in.advocating collective security, 
and in turn,, Secretary of'.::- States Hughes, borrowed heavily from: 
W:Hson..Js Open Door principles~ Secretary of State Hughes, in this 
instance, had displayed the initiative in convoking the conference 
and preparing its agenda. 
As we shall see, the treaties of the WashingtonOonference 
were merely the traditional Far Eastern policy of the United States. 
Nothing much was really gained or lost. The treaties were a re-
c-ognition-, of the existing facts and an attempt to preserve the 
peace which had been founded on those elements 1 however contradio-
t"'ory, those elements characteristic of the status ~in the Fan· 
tli&3~rE"ast~. One commentator (Griswold in his The FarrEastt Policy 
of the United States) assesses the result of the conference as 
8freezing 11 the Pacific. Tllis 11freezing 11 of the Pacific legally 
defined the policy of integrity of Ohina and the Open Doorrwhioh 
prior to 1922 had been moral commitment. 
Tlie restoration of Shantung to Ohina, the celebrated cause 
of the American delegates, still remained a dead-look. Tie 
Ofiinese were opposed to all compromise and the Japanese delegates 
had been instructed to stand fi~ Secretar,y Hughes persuaded 
the delegates from Ohina and Japan to hold joint meetings for 
the restitution of the province, with the exception of the rail-
way, for he realized the importance of restoring the province in 
parttif not wholly. 
It-:was the opinion of the Harding Administration that those 
Senators who would oppose .the Four-Power:Treaty and who expected 
to fight againsttthe ratification of a Nine Power Oompac-t:t would, 
in the event the Shantung;probaem remained unsolved, grasp the 
unsettled problem as the chief points of opposition to the other_ 
21 
treaties. Wb:ile it was agreed that: Shantungsllad ·no direct'.:, bear-
ilig upon any of the proposed treaties_, the opposition in the Senate 
l:ielieved that the American public would uphold.:this argument; the 
argument rthat the troublesome question of Shantung,;should be 
21 
New York T~mes, January 10, 1922, p. 6sl. 
settied:llie:f'Ore the United St~tes closed the ag;-eementt c:oncernin-g; 
the FarrEastern .question. CJ.ertainiy, this argument would make 
the treaties easier to oppose in the Senate. Even those favQring; 
the treaties, had to admit the strength of such an argument, but 
they had planned that when·the Senate received the treaties, the 
Shantung question would be settledo PresidenttRarding in a press 
release a.nnounoementtstated that the settlement of' SH.antung would 
22 
be necessary to the success of the Conference. Tile CB.inese::: 
were inp.uenced by PresidenttHarding~;and6 Secretary Hughes to take:: 
ad~ntage of the terms offered by the Japanese delegates or risk 
o:omplete loss of the Provinceo Tfie Cli:inese"'a.ccepted this offer. 
Shantung, under the new terms, was to be returned in full sover-
eignty to CHina but because of the Japanese railway loans, Japan 
would, economically, remain supreme in the Provinceo 
Meanwhile, on the floor of the Senate, criticism of the Shan-
tnng negotiations,Jdelay, brought a considerable cross-fire ofc 
ac~usations between Republicans supporting the Administration 
and the old 11irreconoilable". group. (Tl-eaty with Germany) Senator 
Lodge, who continually defended Senator UnderwoodJs explanation 
of the Shantung_delay, was the only Republican to challenge 2; 
Senators Borah, Brandegee, and Johnson. Se.n.ator Johnsoro 
22 
New YOrk Times, January 11, 1922, P• ;sl. 2; 
67 (2), 06ngressional Record, p. 14;2-5, January 20, 1922,. 
Clf; N"ew York Times, January 21, 1922, P• ;,;. 
S&nator'Walsh of MOntana and Senator King of Utah, Democrats, 
the last two among,~~he Wilson leaders Who fought for 
ratification of the Versailles Treaty, took part ir.nthe 
d~bate. Walsh had proposed a resolution to ask the 
Presidenttf6r the facts concerning the negotiations on1SJ:\.antung. 
asked why the Shantung question should be barred from·: c:onsideration-: 
because of the Tfeaty of Versailles; Lodge asserted that the powers 
already bbund 'by the 'l"reatt of Versailles had~:no righttto vote on·: 
a question b':et'Ween Japam and China~ 
Senate criticism of the FSur-ibwer Treat~ 
T~ ;cSl:iantung problem was not the only consideration of the 
delegates at the Washingtom Conference~ There were the Nine .Power, 
· Custa>ms Ti.ri:f'!r Treaty, the Nine PoweuTreaty, the T"".teaty of the:: 
Island ofrYap, the Treaty Concerning,~Jiinese Principles and Poli-
cies, and the Treaty on Limitation ofrNaval Armaments. However, 
the most debated treaty vas the FOur-Power Treaty Which bound 
each powerr u_to respecttthe sovereignty, the independence and the 
-
territorial and administrative integrity o:f"i-CHina"-. Tliis non-
reoogni tion pledge was very much identical to the ~ot:-e-Ta.kahira 
agreements and similar agreements of the old Open Door policy. 
Secxetary Hughes, With the delegates from the other powers, had 
again in this instance, not only borrowed from the principles of· 
Hay and Wilson, but also borrowed the very phrasing of former 
Open Door agreements. 
Secretary Hughes 1 fine handling of the conference at Wash~ 
ington and the treaty negotiations, was not aauepted in tot$ by the: 
-. 
Sanat.e.: Senat.e·:.:t.reat.y debat.e on t.he Four-Power:. Ti'eat.y cent.ered 
around f'ourrdd.f'ferent.~point.s of' views 111) t.hose Who favored t.he 
... -
4o.· 
t.teaty with or without. Commit.t.ee reservations, 2) those who f'av~r­
ed only if' reservations were included, 5) those Who opposed the 
t.reat.y because it limited conferences t.o t.he four-power members 
rat.her than inoludinggall nations and 4~ t.hose who opposed the 
t.reaty under any conditions or circumstances simply liecause it.t 
24 
.was a foreign entanglement .. 11 The following is a sampling of' 
some of' the argwnents used for and against the Treat.y, from March 
25 
2nd tcb March 27th. 
At.t.it.ude of' the Senat.e::. 
Tlle decision made (While dd.scussing the limitation:"of' naval 
armaments) by t.he delegates not to use the Pacific Islands as 
naval bases from Which to promote American interests in10hina~ 
disturbed many of' the SenatorsQ Senator Lodge assert.ed that there 
was no fear of' Japanese at.tack on t.he Sakhalin~Island. 
Senator Borah did not trust.~Japanese motivess 
If the Japanese had beam willing _to get out. of' Siberia, if' they 
had been Willing t.o get out of' Manchuria and surrender the T~ent.y­
One Demands ••• [it. woulddbe] Worth more than all the treat.ies that. 
could be writt.en.. 26 
Some Senator~ Were concerned over the secrecy of' the treaty, some 
overl'the moral obligations to go to war under the treaty, some 
were concerned over the Japanese threat to the peace. 
Many Senators maintained that the treaty was an alliance; 
its proponents e.sserted,:ithe.t it was not an alliance.. Senator 
277 
Underwood, Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, de-
fended the Administration's position. 
Tfie United States understands that under the statement in the 
preamble or under the terms of this treaty, there is no commit-
ment to armed fOrce, no alliance, no obligation to join in any 
defense. 28 
Senator Underwood assured the Senate that the language was not 
the same as the Anglo-Japanese alliance. 
41 
·~·I will say that if the American people had known during the 
negotiation that we were going to get rid of a menace in the Paci-
fic Ocean in the form of the Anglo-Japanese pact by making this 
agreement to keep the peace, I believe the great American people 
would have then approved it just as they approve it now.. 29 
Tae=points of contention were the construction of the treaty, its 
authorship, its implications, and the nullification of the Anglo-
Japanese alliance., Senator .lrorah Cl>ntinued in;the following vainJ 
27 
The Senate Foreign Relations Committee reported the treaties 
favorably to the Senate on· February 26th, 1922. At the same 
time the Committee adopted by a vote of 10 to 5 the Brandegee. 
reservation, of no commitment to use force. 
New York Times, p. 1:7, February 26, 1922. 
28 
S~cretary Hughes countered the debate of secret authorship by 
e. clarifioation:of its authorship in a letter to the Senate. 
He stated that he prepared the draft himself and exchanged 
29 
it with the other delegates and submitted it to Senator Lodge 
also. 67 (2), Congressional Record~ p. 5712, March 11, 1922., 
677(2), Congressional Record, P• 5715, March 11, 1922., 
One politic.s.l group g~ves rise to a.nothlen- politic:s.ll group ••• 
everyone makes a ser.d.es of?'" alliances and a:alls them agreement-s. ;.o 
Therefore, he concluded, When corrected.ri by Reed:. Who mai.nt&.i:rred 
that·: the treaty was on-ly, a.magreementJ to confer, there is no neecll 
for the treaty since no obli~tion can lie assumed.i o:ro the par:t; of 
;l 
the U.nited Stat~s. 
Secretaey: Hughes, assuming that the success of' the Washing~ 
tom Co:n:ferenee was based on acceptance o~ the Four-Power:. Treaty, 
consented: to reservations which implied:. the use of force. .Presi-
'dent Harding also agreed to reservations as long_:as there was no 
other way of Senate approval. Reservations of this kind would, 
off course, rum counter to the Brande~e reserva.tiom adopted pre ... 
'VIiouslr,(by the Foreign.' Relations:oOommittee. Thtt.s meant that;': there 
would:1 'Be more ree:son~ for opposi tioxn to the treaty. 
ROll Gall Vote Abalysis 
The oppositiom to the treaties of' the Wash.'ingtoxn Conference 
was n.0t emirely partisan. BOth Republica.ro and Democratic Senatora) 
in general, f'a!V'ored international pa.rt.icipation.during the early 
twenties. Only four Republicens:t Borah of Idaho (Roo ley' MOuntain 
. . 
Region), France of Maryland (Border State Region), Johnson·, of' 
. . . 
O~lif'ornia (P.acif'io Coast), and La Follette ~f Wisconsin (Great 
- . 
Plains), were visibly voting outside·:::the Republican ranks. These 
;o 
67 (2), COngressional Record, P• ~788, ~h 1~, 1922. 
~l 
Ibid., JIP• ;795 f'f • 
four Repuh'lioa.ns from: the f'oun·differe~_regj,ons of' the Unit-edl 
Stat-es did not reflect the attitudes of' their respective regions 
~2 
norx the attitude of vested interests. Thes.e Senators opposed:: 
the treaty because theyc·l:ielieved. thatt the treaty would in: no weu 
~2 







Senators Borah', France, and Johnsom were voting: agains'ti.. 




THose voting a~inst the treaty were the same as for the 
Yap treaty, with the adctitiom of'· L!i Follette, Shields o:ff 
Tennessee, Smith of Sout.h fh.rolin:Q., and Stanley of Kentuclcy'. 
67 (2), Cmgressione.l Record, p. 4497, M3.T.ch 24, 1922. ·. · 
. 
Treatw on the Limitation' of Naval Anmamel:rtsc 
For· 74 
A~t l _ 
The one dissenter was Senator France of l&ryland. 
67 (2), Congressional &cor~~ pli 4718, MB.rel:h 29, 1922. 
Treaty Concerning=; Oliinese Prineiples s 
For 66 
Against 0 
67 (2), Con-gressional Record, P• 4789, March 29, 1922. 
Chi.nase Customs Tatrif'f Treaty.s 
For 58 
A~inSt~ ll 
Senators Fa:anee and JOhnson) 'WOted for the treaty; the one 
dissenter was ICing, Demoerat'L of' U:tl!.h:• There were originally 
severe treaties. reco:tm:~~endecil by the Foreigm Relations Committee_ 
for approval. 
67 (2), Congressional Record, P• 4V91, Ea~oh ,0, 1922. 
benefit the united Stll.tes iro the F!ar East. They therefore votecil 
according to their personal pcint.S of' v-iew. NOr did t\b.ese four 
Republicans consistently ~te ixna bloc on- each: of' the t-reaties 
of' the Washingt,on:Oon:.f'erenee. Except for Senator F'-rs.nce, the othen 
three Senators, BOrah, Jbhnson:and La Falletta v.oted Witlh the 
majority/on: the limitation of: naval etnnSment.s, the Chinese Oustoms 
Tari.f'ft Treaty 1 and the Treaty Conce~ Chinese Principles~ and 
Policies~ 
n::;. AJ;SUmma.cy om RapublicaxnAt'titudes :a.ndc.1 Policies, 1905=1922 
Exaautive leadership 
In __ eaah::iseue .'the dra.:f'ts of the treaties or acts were either 
prepared(by the delegates of the Administration or the majority 
recommendation~of 'the F6rei~~Relations 06mmi1i1iee; each issue, itn 
1i1lrnt was defended on the floor of the Senate by the Committee 
chairman.; Bi-partisan policy and non-partisan fOreign policy had 
lieen;;proposed ~s acpossi bl.e remedyytd> improve the relations be-
tween 'the Presiden-t and his Congress. T~e fact:remaina, as it-
always has, that the President has 'to frame his own policyy'to gaim 
the support _of -his party Q. The President in trying;:;to control an 
Administration policy is able to appoint such leaders as will 
d$fend the Administrations' position• Tliis is, for example, 
precisely what .PreaidentJ.Harding did., 
PresidenttHa.rding managed to obtain-._approval of his trea-ties 
(Washington Conference) by appointing members of the minority 
opposition in negotiating the treaties and by keeping opposition 
ta> himself within-chis party at a minimmn ... We shall see that 
PresidenttHoover also selected delegates from both political 
parties to representtthe United States at the London:C6nference 
of 19,0.. Hence, the Administrative and party sponsorship of 
~orei~ policy stems from the efforts of the President to unite 
his party• This has been a long-ao:cepted strategy of partyypoli-
tics. 
Hay: ·a.ndd ~osevel tthad·:~ long ~:ago oono ludedd that the American:. 
people would not fight to support the Open Door and the territor-
ial integrity of the Far Eastern policy.,. Secretary Hughes itried 
t'b maintain-~tlil.is traditional policy of his predecessors, for the 
Barding~Administration had no intention of completely abandonning: 
American interests in the Far East. Actually, the efforts that'.:. 
tlil.e United States made from 1898 to 1922 to protect--Ohina1s in-
teg~ity were not very successful., One can conclude, then, from 
the position taken during this period, that Ohina never was to the 
United states a vital .American interest. Economically, the FS.rr 
East:was a relatively unimportant markettf6r American commerce 
46 
and invest:gtent., Why should the United States jeopardize its own 
territorial integrity (Philippines) by annoying a possible attack-
er!(Japan)'l Japanese :f'riendrShip was as important:ifcnot more im-
portant than·~OJiina in: terms of both strategy:· and economic inYestment. 
Some factors of historical accident 
W~at~ then, was the unique relationship between the RepubQican 
party and Far Eastern policy? Oboperation with other powers had to 
47 
lie perpetuated in:: orderrto ma-intain .. what little economic:-: hOlding~ 
eXisted~ No administration could possib[y under the circ~tances 
advance more than an economic interest,·in'ltha -~rrEast~. American 
private ;in'tlerest in business d·id not press f'or markets in the Fa..n· 
East-~any more than:·,in any other investment or trade areas.dn: the 
world" T6 associate the Repubtl.ican:party_with direct commercial· 
interests and as representing·:the greater portion of' the 0so-called 
Wall S'6reet ·interests~, is fallacious. If'-the Republican party- held·: 
tb the concept of' expansion-, we should ask the question, Whetherr 
o~mmeroial expansion presuppoee~1ter~itorial expansion orrvice-
Vtersa. In order to establish a network of'' trading houses and·.· in-
vestment speculations, it would seem that the Republican Administra-
tiolt1Would insure its policy bY makin:g more of' an ef'f'orttto recei~ 
a slice in:··the partition of':" Ol'J.ina at the time, and in that way 
discard one aspect of' the original Open Door policy then and there" 
A Republican administration as representing a small propor-
.n. 
tion of' the Republican party determined the Far Eastern policy 
... 
in." the twenties. A ~publican administration hade! "stumbled into 
A 
mar Eastern politics With the acquisition of' the l?hilippines"; 
ittwas the task of later administrations to maintain a polic:y"J 
Which would defend this acquisition and keep an equilibrium bn 
the Pacifio~Oceaa. 
Tllia cxoneistency of::-foreign policy- during the early--twenties 
would be diffioW.t to evaluate.. In each instance of the Shantung: 
question, and the Washingtorr,08nference of 1921, the evidence de-
rived from the opinions and final roll oall votes in the Senate 
indicates that neither the Republican party nor the Democratic 
party objected to or favored the particular policies involved 
in:: the issues discussed .. 
O!LU'rER IIIs VESTED'~ INTERESTS a PHILIPPINE INDEPENDENCE 
A.. Introductiom 
There is never any assurance of party unity. TYie Ol>mbina-
tion of many economic and geographical factors hinders party 
crohesion. Economic crises in the whole nation. and ~;~conomicr. 
differences in particular regions of the nation make for varying 
degrees of political conflict b'etween region-s and political 
parties. This is especially true of economic issues that involve 
dbmestic~affairs. RSgional and economic differences Which hinder 
party:.·unity may include certain:: aspects of vested interests. 
Tiie economic and regional differences are not"lcon:f'inedto v.ested 
d.uterae'ha:t'1but.-~inc lude jd:it:fff'eren.oes in: economic~: factors• 
In. addition1to the:executive leadership ani the personal 
Senate leadership as party limitations in-_f6rmulating::foreign. 
policy, therefore, there are the limitingLresults of economic~ 
and ge.ographical factors. Tiiis discussion!is concerned with 
this problem of economic and geographical factors - local in~ 
t-erest and parochialism. This discussion will serve to illus...-
trate how Republican Senators representing special interests in 
t-heir states voted in- opposition to the policy of a Republican 
Administration• The vested interest, of this economic e.nct-: 
political issue, was the interest of the farmer, specifically, 
the beet-sugar grower, who because of the competing~ sugar. markett 
of'~he Philippine Islands, were anxious to give the Philippines 
her1 independence. Tlie agrarian opinion was thatt Philippine in-
dependence would increase the domestic market for beet-sugar, 
by eliminating;lhilippin-e c-ompetition, and in· that way, provide-
a bigger markettfor the United St;ates g~owers. The issues in-... 
vol ved in') Philippine independence best illustrate specifically, 
with respect to the United States relations in·,the Far~East, 
all aspects of economic recovery and a preocroupation: With tariff's, 
quotas, and trade,barriers. 
Tlie problem of an evaluation of the issues of Philippine in-
dependence is a threefold problem. First, ~here was the problem 
of the sugar-beet growers in obtaining markets for their crops. 
Tnere was the problem of the tariff bill amendments Which pro~ 
vided for payments of a bounty to sugar growers as protection: 
a~inst Philippine suga~. There was also the problem of the. 
strategic value of the Philippines to the United States which 
was the prime consideration of the Administration.;. The attitudes 
... 
of the Senators and the voting alignments Will serve as the basis 
f'br determining the areas in Which these problems besttillustrate 
vssted interestse. 
~.Ba~kground of~Independence MOvementt 
:Adininistt-atiom policy in early years of annexatiotn 
The native independence movementtbegan in•the early yearso 
of annexation. Tlie foremost native leaders in1the Philippines· 
became troubled When American trade beman to increase to the ex~ 
tent that the Philippine econo~ was so dependentton~Americanj 
t-rade that independence .. might bring economic disaster.. Rutto1:1:ei-
ctial administrative policy was such thatt.Philippine representatives 
made little impressiom upon; OOngressional members. .Philippine in-
dependence was mentioned in both Republican and Democratic plat~ 
1 
f:Orms. No President', (MoKinley in his message to Congress, !Teo-
ember· 1899,, ROosevelt in his message to Congress, December 1904, 
1906 and January 1908, Tti'tt Wilson; Harding ~and Caolidge) and-~ no 
2 
partyy as evidenced from excerpts of party platfrorms, had.: failed 
t~ recognize the need for .Philippine independence. Senator Mason} 
Republican from Illinois exclaimed~ liefore the Senate Oliamber in1 18991 
••• I can see those conventions [tramocratic and Republican] bustling 
aadr' hurrying :along:;to get on record first for: the old-faahionedl 
dec lS.rati 6nr-:in ,fay:o rr,o:f; ''>human . u betty :.and independence 'for '.the -
.Philippine Islands... ~ 
The Republican policy pursued by the Administration during the 
nexttdecade was, of course, one of great friendliness for the 
l 
71 (2), Congressional Record, p. 4797· 
2 
Ibid., p. 4798-99. 
~;. 
Vol. ~2, Part<.II, 06ngressional Record, February 14, 1899, P• 184~. 
Filipinos. With the Republican victory in 1920 the mndependence 
movements were pushed in the background. B,1 the beginning of the 
4 
thirties, however, Philippine trade had increased. Fll'ee trade 
with the Philippines areated a one-sided.'dependence on:,American 
52 
exports. This was the problem with Which advocates of independence 
had to contend. 
The need for independence and tariff revision 
THe economic situation in the United States warranted a more 
serious consideration of the independence isauese One of the pri-
mary theories of post•war Republi~anism was that if the United 
States were self-contained, the United States Would be capable 
of prospering regardless of world conditions. This was the basis 
upon Which post-war Republicanism had been formulated. The decade 
between 1920 and 19~0 might have been considered in·:Oongress as 
the peak of Republican supremacy; and although both parties favored 
revision of the FOrdney-McOftmber tariff act, both the 1922 Actt 
and its revision in~l~O were passed by Congress. The Fnrdney-
McCUmber tariff' put Philippine~trade in a more favorable position-' 
on the American ·marketi While the Republican industrialists pros-
pered under the high protective tariff, American agriculture 
4 
from: statistics cited in.-72 (1), Congresdonal Record, p. 428, 
December 14, 19~2. 
5 
cha.ffled under the economic ma.lad·:justmento 
There had ijeen prior to 19?0 numerous independence billse 
THese independence bills Were no longer allowed to be pigeon-holed .. 
Utider the lobby~ng pressure of' such organizations as the Farm 
BUreau ~deration, a powerful farm bloc appeared in both houses 
of' OOrtgress.. T!ie insurgent Republicans ''~'ho constituted the f'arm 
bloc were willing.to vote With the Democratic minority since 
R~publican promises of' agricultural prosperity in the 1928 c~ 
paign~seemed~remote .. Western Republican Senators, Whose .consti-
tuents were members of' f'arm or~:nizations, quickly seized upon 
the independence liills in order to remedy the serious f'arm pzro-
blem of' their constituents. 
5:) 
Grayson Kirk, Fhilippine Independence, New Yorkt Fcar~ar and 
Rinehart' Inc., 19?6, P• 77. 
cr.. Th'e Su:garr Intereste, 
Manufacturing~interesta 
8) 
By 19~0 766 f'S.ct'Ories were engagE:!d in the production of" 
54 
beet~sugar, 6~ of which represented the following states: 00lorado 1 
17; Michigan, 16; Dalifornia, 1'; utah, 6j Idaho, 5; Wisconsin; 4; 
and Nebraska, 2. Early in 19~0, therefore, the manufacturing 
interests of the sugar-b\eet;·:MoWers was expressed before Congress. 
Til.e following,:are a sampling of theFost .representat'd.ve debates: 
lir.oughttom the Senate floor. SenatorrVandenberg read a letter in 
one of his speeches from.George W. ~Cormick, president of the 
Menominee Sugar Company of Menominee Michigan. 
Ifrpresenttconditions continue to prevail and no relief is granted 
by Cangress there would be no object in the several beet-sugar 
o:ompanies of:'" Wisconsin, Michigan, and Ohio attempting ::to operate 
another year o This Will mean the simultaneous closing ;of 22 iieet.Jeo. 
eragar1 :factories in this area, involving an investmentto:f'"· ~5 mil-
lion in round numbers, and the closing of a market for sugar or 
beets to fully 20,000 farmers Who are· growing that- crop. 7 
S&nat·orrRS.nsdell of Louisiana pointed out further ditticultiesa 
They (the factories] relate to the industryts value to the rail-
road of the country, to the reduction of our farm surplus crops 
thus aiding in farm relief, the close tie between beet~growinm 
and live-stock production, and the great-~importance of sugar,.. 
lieets onwestern reclamation projects,. 8 
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(2), Congressional Record, p. 66~7. 
71 (2), Congressional Record, p. 1~05, January 9, 19,0. 
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Ibid., P• 1299. 
55 
IIllelieve::that every representative of the. Westton this floor will 
a~es to the'"statementi.that the 'Beet-sugar crop is the mosttim-
portant agricultural crop in the Rocky Mountain-; Reg;ion. It is.j 
proving to be one of the very few ,_g;-:icultural crops throum which 
the people of the arid-land states can return to the Federal 
gQvernemnt the cost of reclamation projects. 9 
Other1· cn:msiderations 
Some members of the Senate reflected upon other topics con-
cerning the Hawes-Outting bill (the Philippine Independence Act"). 
On the one hand there were legal considerations. Senator Oa,pe-
land ofrNew York objected to independence because, he said, it 
10 
was entirely unconstitutionale SenatorrRObinson of•Indiana 
pointed out that the status quo must continue according tb the 
W~shington ~eaty and that the United States must not arouse the 
11 
forces in tb.B P!ar, Eastle. Senator.:: Ttding~ o~ Maryland argued 
fi:>r at leaatta seven year pre-independence period because of the 
9 
71 (2), Congressional Record, P• 1299, January 9, 1950. 
These,debates point up the domestic aspect of the sugar problem. 
ot: the total investments of Americans in the Philippines, the 
agx:icultural investments were the least and would not warrant. 
tt:Jo much consideration. Senator Bingham, Oliainna.n of the Senate 
<ll>mmitt-ee on·; T-erritories and Insular Af"f'airs, in a report··~· '}jefore 
the Senate tried to protect American investments in the Philippines. 
1257,000,000 total investments 
$115,ooo,ooo bOnds 
. 55,000,000 manufacture 
;o,ooo,ooo Mer~antiie establishmentg 
lO,ooo,ooo ag~iculture 
Oited from 72 (1), Oongressional Record, p. 429, December, 14, 1952. 
10 . 
72 (1), COngressional Record, p. 14275, June 29, 1952. 
11 
~·-' p .. 14'4455· 
situation.1im Minohuria and·:the Far·Eastt On:-,the other hand, 
there were moral aspects of ~he bill Which had ~o be co~sidered. 
Senator VendenJierg_;;of' Michigan expressed concern for those Ameri-
cans Who had bought bonds for the Fhilippines. He declared ~hatt 
the governmenttwas under a moral obliga~ion to ~hose Americans 
12 
Who had inves~ed time and money in the Fhilippine Islands. 
Senator Shortridge of California spoke for adequate immig;at~orrJ 1' c·lauses, While Senator Bingham complained that immigration 
14 
clauses were being forced through by Qalif6rnia Senators. 
Aside from specific issues taken on the bill and aside fro~ 
particular: interests involved {the sugar interesttbeing the :f'bre-
most), the positions taken on the bill in the Senate were threes 
1) those Who were enthusiastic·to give the Filipinos immediate.; 
in~ependence and who were not interested in the economics of the 
bill, 2) those who feared that without economic tutelage during 
a certain period of time, the Filipinos would go into ec~nomio· 
and financial chaos followed by physical chaos, and ') those 
who did not believe in independence for thirty years~ 
12 
7g {1), OOngressional Record, p. 14,77, June ,0, 19,2. 1' ~., P• 14274. 
14 
ill!!.•, P• 14274. 
m O:Ommitteec~an.d. Administration- AtttitudBSJ 
fteporttofithe Senate committee. 
Tl'ieeSil!nate 03mmitttt·e. otr• Tel"ritories and I!J.sular Affairs, 
after considerableadeliberationy submitted·t~ the Senate a 
17 
favorable reportt f'br~. immediate independence Within a f'i vas 
year:c period., The Committee, however, had not considered the 
implications of sovereignty; :f'6r example, economic,collapse 
might resulttif independence were granted pre-maturely. The~ 
16 
time appeared right and the movement appeared ready for action. 
T'fie report ',was significant 'Pecause itt represented the agrarian 
.,. 
states (the majority of'. members being :f'ronr, agrarian-, states) andJ 
o:onsequently cuttacross party ·lines ... 
Olrcumstanees wereesuch that acneptance of' the report was 
made impossible. The election of' 19~0 gave a D~mocratic majority 
in the House and Republican leadership was still in a dilemma 
whether t~ support·::the agrarian interest Which was for: lhilippine 
16 
57 
Sije APPENDIX D :£'6r a list of' the members of' the Senate Committee 
on Territories and Insular Affairs, 7lst Congress, 2nd Session. 
17 
71 (2), Senate Report, May, 19;0. 
Signed by aix·cDemocrats 
from: Nevada·, GEJorgia, Louisiana; Arimona, Maryland and· 
Missouri. 
and four Republicans 
from C~li:f'ornia, Michigan, North Dakota, and New ~xico. 
Tfie four not in agreement from 
Connecticut, Rhode Island, Indiana, and West Virginia, three 
of' which are non-agrarain states. 
independence or the Administration which opposed immediate inde-
pendence. Economic-demands as yet had not impelled a complete 
»reak with the Administration policy. 
TRe House Hearings also represented an eagerness for adoption1 
of an independence bill. Representative Swit~er, speaking for the 
Committee, said that the Committee believed that a moral obliga-
tiomwould rest on the United States to respect Fhilippine sover-
eigq.ty. He continued,hbwever, that the O.OmmitteEh proved that·~.the, 
charg~s ofr'alleged c:ompetttt'tl.or.n of:- ihilippine with domestic- farm: 
18 
products was economically unsound·~ The House ~Hearing§ were 
"'.ery comprehensive and indicated a definite stand for~ihilippine 
independence., 
,Results of= Administrative _oppositio:m 
However:favorable the committees of O.Ongress were t'b 
19 
Philippine independence, spokesmen fbr the Administratior.n 
remained opposed .. In addition to the Administration, the ltarge. 
20 
urban papers opposed independencee. Tbe New York Herald-~ibune 
of. June 29, 19'2 reported the followings 
Senat'br Hawes and hii:J allies are feverishly anxious to take advan-
tag~ of these conditions to pass a measure, fundamentally un"' 
18... . 
72 (1), Oangrassional Record, p. 255, February 2, 19,2. 
19 
72 (2), Ocngressional Record, p. 1925, January 16, 19),. 
58 
Statements cy Se-cretary Stimsoro, Hyde, Secretary of Agriculture 
Ohapin, Sec-retary of Odmmerce, and Hurley, S@cretary of War:. 
20 
Outtof 582 papers representing all the party affiliations and:· 
g~ographical locations 27% favored independence and 57% 
opposed independence. 
Kirk, ~ ~., p .. 111,. 
59 
o:onstttutionalu.. It.t is inconaei vable that more than a trifling 
minority would b'e dishonest enough to sacrifice one of the N"ation 1 s 
g~eattassets and the welfare of the islands to the interests of a 
few lobbYists~·· 21 
When~- 06ngress passed the Bill, the New York Herald-Tribune called 
itt a " disgraceful vote 11 ., 
PresidenttHOover 1s veto of the Fhilippine·,bill is a document~,. •• 
T'liat the House. should override· it without seriously attempting : 
to meet its arguments is an act at once discreditable and alarm-
ing ••• BUt it seems to us, and we think it must seem to all 
Republicans, that in af~irming their stand against their: party's 
policies and traditio.ns, as well as againstttheir country 1 s interests 
and good name, the Repubilicans who voted with the mob ••• betrayed' 
a ~publican President and the Republican electorate.... 22 
The Ne\"1 York Times b-rought t.addi tional interpretatii.ons to the 
Presidenttal veto~ and at the same time pointed out the hurried 
proceedings of the House., 
o.,.Tbe hope of more cautious and mature action lies in the S9nate. 
In that body there are doubtless some members ready to be as 
short-sighted and reckless as the Representatives and to delight im 
humiliating President Hoover. But What about the Senators who are 
close to GOvernor ROosevelt and Who would be influenced by an. 
intimation of his wishesf It has been understood that he is 
not satisfied With the pr~sent form of the Philippine bill ••• 
If they are well advised (the Senators] they will join With 
Senators of like' sober mind in .. upholding the Presidential vet.o ••• 2; 
This opinion did not effecttthe decisions of the Senate vote, 
for the Senate passed the bill over the Presidentail veto. The 
farm leaders fully intended to push their measure through regard-
less of the consequences. 
21 
Oited from 72 (1), O'ongressional Record, p. 14261, June 29, 1952 .. 
22 
New York T!meB. p. 12, January 14, 19~;. 2; 
Olted from 72 (2), Congressional Record, p. 1796, January 14, 19;;. 
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~ The ~riffrBill ana Its R~lationship to the Agrarian Vbte= 
A cliserr examination of' the final voting wilL perhaps illus-
tt'ate the effectiveness of' the farm b'loc~in determining"the success-
f'.Ul passage of' the Independence bill.. Both the sugar clauses of':· 
the Tariff Act of 19.50 and the independence votes Will serve to 
illustrate the united action of the insurgenttRipublicans. 
Purpose of'bounty payments 
Senator Borah headed the Senate Westerners in their plans 
to fight for a two cent impost duty during_:the debates on the 
sugar tariff'" He was aided by Republican Senators La Follette and 
~ndenberg and Uemocratic S&nators Broussard, Copeland, and 
Ha~ison• The amendment that the S~nators wanted to force through 
··, 
on the tariff bill provided for payments of a bounty to sugan· 
growers to supplement the protection afforded by the customs 
duties. Tne plan was a means of' providing protection for dom-
estic growers againstt.Philippine sugar admitted free of duty<;>. 
'!'he Senators argued that a bounty plan was the only means of' 
protection. Tlh.e Western Senators doubted if' they could gain. 
enough support to pass the bounty measure which was part' of' the 
tariff· bill. T:P:e measure depended upon attractin-g:=;a substantial 
amount of' Democratic Senators.. TBe differences were made up be-
t11een the beet.;,sugar growers in the Westtand the cane-sugar g;-owers 
in the South .. 
Oll.ne and b'eettsuga.r interests combine 
. 24 
Senator Ransdell of· Louisiana spoke specifically for the 
cane g~owers in the S~uth, asserting that since the Bemocrati~ 
platform had~pledged farm relief, the Democrats should support 
a high tariff .a Tlie cane sugar interests were to give the ·wsstern 
g2;owers ad:equate supporttf:Or a high sugar tariff. The support·t of:' 
6lJ 
the cane sugar g~owers did not mean complete agreement} some Senators 
favored the bounty while other Senators favored higher tariff rates. 
Tae Harrisaroand Smoot amendments 
25 
SSnat-or.: Harrison proposed an amendmentt which would continue 
the existing rate ... He relied on the support of the .Es.stern:. Repul:ili-
cans. There were three viewpoints which out across party lines 
on-, the sugar tariff. Tl'ie first was the maim Re.publican supportt 
led by Smoot, Onairman: of the Finance Oommittee •. H-e had the sup.-
port of Democrats Ransdell and Broussard of Louisiana. The sec-
ond was the bounty for domestic sugar growers SJUl no tarifi'c in-
crease Which would result in higher pric·es to the consumer. Thia3 
v~ewpoi~t was expressed by Senator Oopeland, Democrat of Wew York 
and-:Senator BOrah, Republican of' Qldaho. The third v-!.ewpointt 
was f6r the mainten~ce of existing rates.· Opposi tio.n to in.-,.. 
2 
~w York Times. p .. ls5, January 10, 19~0. 
25 
Ibid., p .. ,,~. 
-
cr..rease was st.rong; East.ern Republicans were consolidat.ed on·: t.his 
point.. 
Ori' January 16-t:.h, 19;0 t.he East.ern Republican Senat.ora were 
26 
prepared t.o pass t.he Harrison amendment. The New. York Times 
report.ed t.hat. t.he farm lobtW_put. pressure on t.hose Republicans 
62 
so t.hat.~,t.hey would not. pass t.he amendment.. The remaining Republi-
can Senat.ors would not. vot.e for t.he amendment.; but. preferred an-
ot.her amendment. in it.s place. 
'Me Smoot. amendment., t.o increase dut.ies on sugar, was passed 
by a coalit.ion of insurgent. Republicans and Democrat.s. On March 6, 
27 
19;0, by a vot.~ of-47 to ;9 the Senate reversed its actions of 
28 
January 16th .. Nine .Senat~rs, four Republicans• Jones of Wash-
ington; Metcalf of Rhode Island1 Pine of Oklahoma, Shall of: 
Minnesot.a, ~nd five D~moorat.ss Ashurst. of Arizona, Dill of W*sh-
ington, Hayden of Atizona, Thomas , of Oklahoma and Trammell of< 
Fiorida changed t.heir votes and joined the coalitione It was an 
evide.nt t.rade of votes for none of these Senators came from the 
vttal sugar }jeet·: or cane sugar areas and had no direct interest 
in the sugar tariff". This combination could possibly stop pas-
sage of the Tariff bill in the S!nate. 
26 
New York Times, p. ;e6, January 16, 19;0. 
27 
New York Times, p. ls2, March 6; 19;0. 
28 
Itt had been agreed by a vote of· 48 to ;8 t.o ret.ain duties set , 
in the Fordney-McOUmber Act of 1922. · 
RQ1U1. call vote ':on1 sugar~ tari:f'fr 
The roll call vote on the sugarctariff was the f6llowing~ 
29 
Far the Amendment 47 
ID'8 
D:; 9 
A~instt the amendment· '9 
Rn' 
Dr:26 
~e passage of the Tariff Bill of 19'0 as a whole unit was 
passed With approximately the same proportion as the sugar amend-
ment, but without the nine S@nators voting togethere Only ~rammell 
of the Democrats voted for the tariff with the f6ur Republicans. 
The four Democrats voted against the Bill. Only Broussard and 
Ranadell remained of the coalition• Tlie vote tended more toward 
stricter party lines, although Blaine of Wiscons.on and La FOllette 
of Wisconsin, and Norris of Nebraska of the sugar-~eettareas voted 
against the Bill. The ten other Senators from sugar-beet states 
voted for the bill. 




Againsttthe Tariff Ball 'l 
R 5 
D 27 
Not voting 12 
New York Times, P• '' March 6, 19,0e 
'0 71 (2), Odngressional Record, pe 6015, March 24, 19,0. 
The same regular.party line was f6llowed in the roll call 
~1 
vote on the amendment of the Tariff Act .. of 19~0 
Fnr the amendmentt 







Of those from the beet-:.sugar states :f'our voted for, :f'ive voted 
against$ Republicans Is Follette and Norris again voted againstt 
the party line. 
Tae aims of' the :f'arm bloc 
Tae particular sugar clauses of' the tari:f':f' bill attracted 
more attention;than the Bill in its entirety. In the final 
analysis the Bill: in its entirety did not have the consistent:_ 
attention~·, of the farm bloo. 
Whether or not the economic circUJ#stanoes during the early•: 
thirties :f'6stered i:inmediate tariff' revision·. first and Philippine 
independence second is difficult to determine. Both tarif~·re• 
vision-and the independence movements took root before the decade 
of the twenties. The Tariff Act was in reality somewhat of' a 
defeat :f'or the Fhili:ppine forces. Was P hilippine independence 
~1 
72 (1), Congressional Record, p. 7291, April 1,, 19,2. 
64 
65 
vttally necessary to achieve protection for the sugar interestsf 
T~e agrarian groups had no alternative. Several times the discus-
sions on the sugar tariff involved discussion also of Philippine 
~2 . 
independence., Tme Senators probably realized that should they 
fail in the attempt to secure sugar tariffs, they could succeed 
on: general tariff' revision, and if they failed on: general tarifi' 
revisiotnthey could seize upon the independence issues., Each 
issue may have solved the agrarian problem. The end was the same 
in each: farm relief; the means weee the sames sugar; and the·in-
terests were the same. 
'2 iandenberg, Broussard, and La Follette seemed to labor Philippine 
independence continuously. 
Fl<;. V'ot.ing::Analysis of 'the A~arie.n, Bloc~ 
The House 
Tnere was no doubt., 'therefore, of 'the mo't.ives for 'the align-
ment. of ag~arian Republicans and Democrat.s of 'the House in pass~ 
ing 'the independence bill, April 4t.h, 19~2. There were 
Fclr 'the Bill 





Of 'those Republicans opposing 'the Bill ~9 were from indust.rial 
arease In the House the agrarian members were definit.ely uni't.ed. 
The ~ouse overrides the veto 
Althbu@. 'the measure was int.roduoed in 'the Senat.e as a non-
part.isan bill and had overwhelming non-partisan support in 'the'; 
HOuse prior't.o the Presidential veto of 'the Bill, 'the problem of:-
overriding 'the President.ial vet.o was a Democratic issue •. In 'the 
f.S.ce of a probable execut.ive:veto,.t.he RepubJ.ioans were not.<t'oo 
prone 'to go against 'the Administ.rative po~icy~ 
;4 




(Mart.in of OregorrJ 
~~ 
72 (1), OOngressional Record, P• 7411, April 4, 19~2. 
~4 
New York Time~,,p. 2s~, January 14, 19;~. 
66 
Thec.Sijnate :overrides the veto 
Senator vandenberg was the first Republican to defend the 
::>5 
~esident 1 s positiono However, Senators Hawes and Robinson· 
did not aha.reehis sentiment$ In additio.n to the united supportt. 
of:the D~mocrats in the Senate (except for St1nator Wlpeland), the 
Democrats had the support of twenty Republicans •. 









BOth Smoottand Vandenberg of the agrarian g~oup stood by the 
President and voted against passage. The other representatives 
. (eleven in number) o:f the beet.;.,.sugarrand cane-sugar areas did not 
forfeit<their obijectives tp please the Aliministration. 
Amendments to the Bill of 192ft 
Many amendments were proposed in the Senate before the final 
passage o:f the Fhilippine Independence Bill in 19:;>4$ Senator 
Vandenberg proposed a substitute which would prolong the pre-
::>7 
independence period. Independence would be in three years. 
::>5 
'6 72 (2), Congressional Record, p. 1788, January 14, 19:;>:;>. ~., P• 1924, January 17, 19~~. 
::>7. 
7' {2), Congressional ReeDrd, p. 5162, March 22, 19:;>4 .. 
67 
68 
llemoorats, now iru a majority in the 7;rd;· Oongress, remained in op-
position to all proposals made by Republican,Senators. There re-
mained in the voting on the amendments no evidence of the agrarian 
coalition• Independence after any period of time would suffice 
as long as the sugar quotas stayed intact. Senator Dickinson tried 
in vain to cut the ten year economic transition to five -~are, 
;a 
but·Lwas beaten also by a vote of 49 to 2. A plan: by Senat~n 
Sliipstead for a gradual annual reduction of sugarTand cocoanutt 
oil exports was dismissed without a record vote. 
The final approval of the Independence Bill 
Representative MCDuffie stated to the members of the House 
that the Philippine Odngress would approve the new independence bill 
as soon·as the American Congress would approve the ball. The House 
'9 passed the Bill by accclamatiotr; on: March .19th and the Senate ap-
proved the Bill March 22nd, 68 to 8. Senate oppositio~ncame sole-
ly from Republicans: Austin1 Barbour~ O~rey, Dickinson, Fees, 
4o 
GOldsborough, Kean, and· Vandenberg. 
FlOr the Bill 








7;~'(2), COngressional Record, P• 516;, March 22, 19;4. 
;9 
The Tydings-MCDuffie Bill relinquished the military and naval 
bases on the FhilippinesJ otherwise it was the same as the first 
independence bill Which was not approved by the Philippine 
legislature, the Hawes-OUtting Bill. The Bill was favorable 
reported by the Senate Committee on Territories and Insular 
Affairs, March 6, 19;4. 
New York Times, p. 18s2, March 20, 19;4. 
4o 7; (2), COngressional Record, p. 5164, March 22, 19;4. 
sugar problem. Tne United S~ates government continually negotiated 
wi th'··the representati vee of the sugar industries in· order to stabi-
lize sugar productioroand Congress continued to legislate in order 
to protect the sugar-beet growers by stabilizing sugar quotase 
In: 1941 Senator Brol'lnl D:emo,grat of Michigan: (an important sugar-beett 
state) and Senator Connolly, D.emoorat from Texas, d8t:iated the merits 
4lJ. 
of the Adama•OMahoney Bill, an amendment to the Sugar Acttof 19;1; 
a"liill Which was sponsored by the Administration~because.of the 
chaos in the sugar industry. Senator Browm said:a 
There has been a decrease of 17 or 18% in acreage allotted to 
the Americam beet farmer in 1940 over 19;9. 
He concluded that because of the approaching independence of the 
Philippines, there would be a decline in non-dutiable quotas and 
the deficit in the production of sugar should be allotted to the 
42 
American farmer.. Senator Connolly declared$ 
The Jones~dstigan Act [1916] was sponsored by the sugar interests. 
I assume that the Act of 19;7 was sponsored by the same interests, 
or would not have passed this body; and knowing well how organized 
the sugar producing interests are, I can not conceive that the Aott 
of 19;7 ever would have gotten in the front door of the Senate. 4; 
1 
77 (1), Congressional Raoord, P• 4654 ~~ June ;, 1941. 
42 . 
I:bid., p .. 4656 .. 4; 
Ibid .. , p. 4664., 
Ame:Ddmenttof Sugar Act ~of 19;7 to give deficit quota off 







Only three Senators from sugar-beet areas voted against. 
NOt·tonly were the sugar interests still predominant·~but the 
ag~arian Senators continued to represent their states• interests 
on the floor of the Senate~ 
Sectional interest, specifically, a vestee interest in the 
production and manufacture of cane and beetLsugarrch.aracterized 
44 
the decisive aotiontof Oongress o~Philippine independence~ 
. 45 
Industry opposed the interest of the farmer, while Democrat and 
Republican united to oppose the policy of the Administration-:., 
Taere remains, then, a discussion of the third problem involved 
in the vested interests of Philippine independence. T-he vital 
strateg:!;c i.nterest of the United States in the Philippine Islands 
was the vested interest of Administration leaders. 
44 
Very little mud-slinging characterized the Senate debates on 
the Philippines and the sugar quotas, but political and ec-
onomic 'interests were linked.. Some Senators maintained that 
the Sugar Trust contributed to the Republican party campaigns 
but that the Democratic party refused to accept contributions 
70 
to their campaigns. 64 (1), Congressional Record, p. 66,1, 1916. 
45 -
S!e.; reports of the TS.rifi Oommissio.n and the Department of Agl,"iculture 
· during the thirties .. 
G~ St?ategic Importance of the P.hilippines 
... 
M.rategie ' locatiom of the islands 
S8em im retrospect, the de bates on the issue of P.hilippine 
independence, should have been, apart from any humanitarian con-
siderations, motivated by a desire on the part of the United S~ates 
to insure the strategiC'Seourity of American interests, military 
as well as economic, in the Far Easte In fact, all of the islands 
fi'om BOrneo to the Oiiina coast were vital to tradee Ware those 
islands to be blocked to United States trade, lby\r Japanese 
expansion; A_merioan supplies of tin, ruliber, and manganese, 
for example, would be cut off. Japanese military conquest of 
this area in,World War II had precisely that effect.. The Farr 
Eastern situation·,during the Fhilippine debates had not warranted 
any oonsideratioroof establishing defenses in the Philippines and 
GUa.lm or shifting a fleet to the h.cifio. Til.e independence issue 
was not'primarily concerned With the strategio~value of the 
Philippines nor with humanitarian considerations~ 
Attitude of the Senate committee 
Tlie strategic value of the Inilippines and· any resultantt. 
political repercussions in the Far Eastern countries as a whole 
did not impress the members of the Oammitte$ om Territories and'1 
72 
InsularrAfTairs.. When: Mr. Nicholas ROosevelt, correspondent :for 
the New York Times expressed his opinion to the members of' the 
OOmmittee, that American prestige iruthe Orient would suf'f'er 
because of' Philippine independence, the committee members were 
46 
unimpr\"ssed. Mr. Roosevelt had pointed out the 11 .... uneasiness 
:iirr the Dutch Easttindies ••• and if' it spreads :from there through 
out-Lthe FarrEast, Which at the present time is in a very chaotic'-
condition.~ •• What I want to do is point out the danger of' a slowly 
startling and widespread political distUrbances throughouttthe 
mast Which mi~t very well cause some kind of' serious political 
outbreak .... ". . Again, two years later, in1 19;>2, the mentioro of' 
strategy in the Hearings of' the House Oammittee oru Territories 
and Insular Af'f'airs was quickly dismissed in order to proceed to 
a discussion on trade relations. The discussion reverted to state-
menta by representatives of the Philippine-American: Chamber of' 
Commerce.. Mr .. Lloyd Tliurston, ~publican of' Iowa said& 
"·•• in view of' the Treaty of' Washington, which prohibits the 
United States :from :fortifying the Philippines, and in view of'_-
the fact that the islan4l.s are located 6,000 miles from us, and~, 
that it would be against our naval policy to separate the units 
of' our fleet, and in view of' the naval and military hazards 
~nd liability that we incur by retaining possession::of' those 
islands ••• is it not true that at this time our occupation of' the 
islands creates a greatt,militaey hazard for the United Statesf 11 
71 (2), Sanate Hearings, February 24, 19;>0. 
47 
71 (2), Senate Hearings, p. ;48, February 17, 19;>0. 
M:rJ:. Hurley, SGe-retaey of: War.r col.l.Utle.nedl 
11
_The: .Fhilippine ISland as a~e the Aclii.lles 1 heeil off the tJni ted: S1mtiea:a ••• 
I- am:-ee that im the event of aems.j.!;>r conflio:t With a.nyy pal'len· 1m the 
Orient, the PHilippine Islands might be the firsttto :f'S.dl .. uWe 
are prohibited liy'ortt-eatyy stipulatiom. fiolrll :f"crtifying; them im order 
to hOld them• 0 418 · 
Bothr-Er. Stimson, SecretB.J.Vyof St-ate, and Mr. Hilrley were u.mi.tiedi 
in: opposing~ Pliilippine independence for other:. than strategic re8JOo 
sons as well as strat"9gia ones. Their at.titucle.repr.eaented 
the attitude of the AdminiStration. Searetar.y StimsonJs position 
was thatt independence would be a!lmsastro:ns to the int-er.es:t1s of the 
;. 4& 
Unit"9dl States both om the islands and im the Fa:r:1·East. 11 0The 
political chaos im the Ot?ient tod8.yi is sucltl thatt ir.n JI13'J opinio.n, 
50 
this is no,: time to dead with lhilippine independence." 
... 
The Senate Oommittee_did not agree Witlbthe Administration's 
statements. They asserted the following in a report of June 2~ l9,0s 
The idea of Philippine independence will not disturhthe peace 
of the · Orient liyv inspiring in1 other people there ae desir.e to free: 
themselves. Oonstitutionally Oongress had full power to dispose 
51 
of the lhilippines. The general tone of the Oongressional 
debates reflected agreement With the Oommitteets attitude om this 
aspect,of Philippine independence also. Senator Hawes from Missouri 
stated tgat the UnitedStat&s3could net build fortificaticms. 
48 
72 (1), House Hearing!,, P• 41']7f., February 10, 19,2. 
49 
71 (2), Senate Hear~, P• 228, May 22, 19,0. 
50 ' 
72 (1), Senate Heaa-~, p. 7, Y.ebruazv 11, 19,2. 
5.1 
72 (1), Ooxmressiona.l. Record, P• 14271, Jful.V 1, 19;2. 
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wit.llc>ut viole.t"bg t.lie Wa.s~o:xn T.H:lea.itu and Se:me.tor Xing frollll 
Utah asserted: t.ha.'t.c't.he t.roul:Ues ;of Japan, China.~ and Russia. should. 
not cons:tit.ute ~riers 't.o ~lippine i.l!Id:Bpendence s~ there 
5' Would le no speedy sett.lement of t.he camtrov.ersy. The ~~1-
lowi~ is a. sa.mplinm; of' those represexmat.ives Wb1:):_:'t.esttl.f'ied in 
't.he He~ing~ of the Senat.e Commit.tee~ representatives of the Phili~ 
pine-.A.merioa.m Chamber of Commerce, representa.t.i vas from. the Amari-
can Farm BUreau Federation, memberS3 of the A:ii1ericam Asia.t.ic 
Association of N"eW.'iY6rk, and memlJers of the Institute of ii.cific 
54 
Relalt.ions. Those testimonies .'from: representa.t.i ves of t.he 
a.gra.riSlll a.nd business or~21a.tions were consideredJ more imporla.nt 
55 
t.han t.he 'testimonies frollll specialist.s: on-: Far Eastern Affairs;;. 
Conclusion 
The attitude Wliicl110ongress reflected was one largely of 
indifference to the actual welfare of t.he Filipinos·. The a.pa.tby' 
Which had oharaeterizedi t.he A:tllBrio8.J1l publicr., wa.s typical of t.he 
opinions or:- Oongress towards a.rpossible ffiilippine:; depression-.. 
Wit.h Roosevelt ts message to Oongress im 19,.;', recommending :a.banl!--
donment of military bases, a.lll strategic responsibility BO:rr the 
moment wa.s summa.rily dismissed:,. President Roosevelt!:. had suggest-
ed:1 to Congress in1 his messa~, that, the a.ot allOW for the n:egQ't.ia.-
52. . 
72 (1), Congressional Reoo~ P• 14270, JUly 1, 1952. 
5' Ibid., P• 55', December: 16, 1952. 
54 ... 
71 (2), Senate Hea.riJW!., r--ebrua.ry '' 10, 1,, MB.nch 10, 19,0; 
. . also 72 (1), Senate He.e.r~a1 F"e brua.ey, 19:;2. 
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Prior to 1950 v£Jry 1i ttle was published· in·1 the Ail:ne.is of the 
Americalll AICad:emv of SCience ani the .Political Science Reyiew 
concerning .Pbiilippine independence. Those a.rlicles .: published 
e.f'ter 1950 were an a.oa.demic exercise. 
tiiom :fforrnaval l:i@laea im the ··:euttlreG>. WS:shington:: o:fficials .. ; 
e.:g~eed· 1 \"Tith '!U>osevelttthattthe maintenance of'~ military andd 
nav.al 'Bases in1the Pb.ilippinesJWere a liallility,, and thattthe. 
United Stiat-es had no valid reason f'6r keeping:~the bases. Iro 
hie Inau~al Add,tess of'·-19;; ROosevelt thad ·stressed the il'm-
portance of immediateanat~onal recovery. Tne natuonal leader~ 
ship was pre-oc.Dupied::with tari:f'i's and quotas -all aspects of 
eoonomic~recovery. 
The RElpub'lica.n~ A4minist:rat11.on; recogtiri.zed·J the strategill-: 
impori.ancea of the :Ehi.lippines to the United States • lTesidentt. 
Hoover's veto message had implied indirectly concern oven·Jap~ 
anese expanaion1and developments im Manchuria., 
Tile United Stiates shoulddplainly announceeprior to the time of." 
this pleb1scite whether a) it will make absolute and complet~ 
Withdrawal from all lnilitary and naval bases, and. from every 
moral or other commitment to maintain their independence orr 
b) the condi tiona as to aut.hori ty and rights Wi thim. the Is lands 
underwhichwe will continue that protection. 56 
HOover¥8 concern was not shared by the Republican members of-
Congress, especially those Congressmen who represented the 
agrarian interests of their states. The voting analysis of the 
tariff bills and the independence bills illustrates the sugan· 
interest of this agrarian1 gro.up. Tlie sugar interesttof the 
ag~arian~group made the voting, of necessity, outt.across party 
lines. The issues of Philippine independence illustrate arr! 
alignment of Republican~ and Democratic interests a~inst· a_n, 
Administration policy• 
56 
New York T'im.es, p. 6, January 14, 19;;. 
OHAP!'EB8IV!a UNITED:; PARS.'YYAOT'ION ON·~ F.OREIGN POLICY ISSUES 
A~ Introductiom 
The::sectione.l interests in' Congress based,_: om econom.icrJ 
interesttusue.lly he.v.e :li:een'l those interests Which', were more 
C:Dncerned With domestic a:ef'e.irs •. DOmestic:; issues, such e.s . 
the sugar o lauses of the T'ii.ri:f'f · Bill of 19;50 and the sugan-
quotas of the Philippine Independence Bill, compelled.'the3 
representatives im O.Ongress to heed the de:ma.nds of" his con~ 
stituents. Seot~onal differences such as these, the manu-
facture and production of sugar, meant the livelihood· of'f 
several people in the 0dn-gressman1s d:istriot or state,. The 
:f'e.rm organizations Which also represented the sugar interests. 
putt pressure om Congressmen tm pass the P hilippine in;;-
dependenoe b'ill. TJie sectional cleavages came duringo~the 
thirties When. the de pres sio:m intensified·: co:nf'lictss om these= 
and other domestic issues,. In:times of economic instability 
the vested interests of oon-Qtituents '" li:eoame more pressin-g~; 
and more vi tal .. 
fleotti.onalism was notte.n: attt.ribute of':· American foreigm 
policy until the,,Jlemoo-ratto· pe.rt;ywom oven·the supportt. off 
tlhe·.;lar@esea-board ·cities. 'mle-::Repulilioan supportto:ro if.oreigm 
7fi 
policy.' issues ~shifted:J int-b the interion- west-ern-: state&J and: thee: 
Repub-lican- ag;-ariam int-erests :of--the interli.onwestenn st-ates; 
~ined~ as ,muc:hn iff nG>ttmoree stnengt.h·: as the .:Republican: industri-
ali interest-a ·of the East•. This shif:tt ocrcur:red~: ino:identliily 
ditring~the cont.rov..ersy over.:' Philippine .independence Whioh1 point.~ 
ed up area: interests of the trnited Stat-es, oro the fOreign policy 
of the HOover Administration• 
Nottall the :f'br.eign policies Which directly,or indirectly 
influenced· Flar,·Eastern a:t".fairs were formulated t-o cat-er to the::; 
sectional cleavages of the nation-.. Some of the policies formula ... 
ted -on~ the FB.r1 East, such as the disarmament conference att Land oro 
in,l9,0, could conceivably, because of the sea•b'oard int-erests, 
have lYrought abbutt sectional cleavages. BUt~ this was not<: the.; 
case.. Tlie approval of the London· Naval Tfroeatjy is an; eJC&.mple off 
pari;y-,unity om a Far1·Eastern1 policy:,>. 
This chapter, continuing the discussion,of'the RBpublicaro 
Far East policy, considers two aspects of that .policy; Which de.-. 
rived from a fairly unified party ac~eptance of a policy ~ormed: 
by the Administratio.n. Tliese two aspects center ar.ound the Sen-
ate approval of the London· Naval Treaty of 19'0 and the HOuse-
and Senate approval of the Lend-lease program for China prior 
t'b and during Wcirld War. II.. ~th ofF these aspects are concerned 
with Si®;J.ificanttFB.rr·East-ern.-:a.ffa.irsi one with the relatiw 
strength: of the Japanese fleet< in: the Pacific:, and the othen 
with the economiQ) support of nationalistt.Ohina.. Ti:e Republican 
party, Which was interested ~ iro the original formulation of the 
Open~Door·. policy, it should be recalled, ought:~tb have display~d:. 
c:onsiderable interesttim both of these issues. This chapter will 
crontinue3tib in.vastige.te t-b.is Republican. party interest. A$i:ro, 
the roll call votes will serve to illustrate the reasons fore 
the presenPe or absence of the limiting factors (sectionalism, 
Ex-ecutive leadership, and individual O:Ong;ressional leadership) 
on, thee fOrmulation of foreign] policy irr the Far East.. B""eoause 
this discussion:: contrasts the foreign-: policy of a Republica.ro 
and Democra"ttic·: administration, the spe.n of time liet'Weem the: 
YJ3ars 19;0 e.nd 194!)jserves also as a contrast ~with the fd.rstt 
period, i. e. Hetweer.nl905 and 1922 .. 
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B111 Thee Londb:rn Nav:.al cn,nterena.e, 19~0 
'ale :neede trorrd:isarma.m.ent:, 
Dhring;,'t.he 1:.wen1:.ies 1 most. of 't.he opinion~ expressed im 't.he,; 
United St'ates:;Was for a policy of peace With disarmament, but 't.he 
Adminis't.ration leaders of 't.hattime did not want. to be involved 
in poli't.ical alliances which would mean :Foreign: en1:.anK.~emen1:.~ 
Administratiom leaders later realized that. 't.here could be no peace 
without some reduction and limita't.ion of armament or the then 
popularly known ~term "dd.sarmament.1!. The London Naval Conference:: 
was called to limit expenctii.turesa:fibrr arms.'~ 't.o aliolish submarinea,, 
gas, and baoteriolo~cal warfare and 't.o protect civilain~popula-
tiions from:: aerial bombiitg. These eonsidera't.ions were subordinate. 
1:.~ 't.he considera't.ion of 't.he lOslOc7 ratio of cruisers for the 
Uni't.ed S~a't.es, Great. ffritain, and Japan; 't.he long sought. af't.er 
pari't.y in cruisers be't.ween 't.he United States end Great~· ffi'i't.ain, 
as the 5•5s~ ra't.io had established at. 't.he Washington Conference. 
The~;London Naval Cbnference was essen't.ially a European con-
ferenoe. In Eliro'Pe, Great. Bri't.ain and Frrance:, were dominating the 
League assembly, and Germany was reluo1:.a.n1:. 't.o make 0disarmament.f, 
-
proposals \"ti't.hou't.csecurity agreements wi't.h F,rance, first.. Japants 
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ambi't.ions had become more and more apparent.. Tbe c.on't.inual e:e:f'orlS:>· 
:mad:e:;-l)y: Adininistratiom leaders i.n' 1922 and 1927 (the Washington; 
aonference and the Genev.a conference) to bring about peace With 
disarmamenttwere not wholly: suo-ceall~ul. 
QQJIIDIIi.tt.ee ,c-riticism of the treaty 
The London- N"aval T.rreaty, althougb:·xwt~wholly satisfact;ory 
1 
t"b all Senatbrs and' caBinet members, seemed~t"b remedy the dii.s-
armament.tcontroversy· im the }itarrEastt.as well as imEftrope. The 
Senate P'Xtreign. Relations Oommittee fuund :f'i>ur: points ofc general 
criticism• with the 'f'reaty when itt was o:onsidering the Treaty for: 
reoommendation1to the S~nate •. They were as fOllows: 1) whethe~ 
tbB T~eaty, gave to the United States parity With Great ~ritatro 
80 
in: naval strength, 2) whether. the Treaty actually did not restrict·' 
the United States to build up t·b only 16, 10,000 tonJ cruisers 
prior to the next~conf'erence in 19;5, ;) whether GreattBritain 
c:ould buildCnew cruisers to the disadvantage of the United States, 
and, 4) why the United ·states oonceeded a greater ratio to Jape..tli 
without insisting on ·.modif'Yingo;the provisions of the ~washington; 
Treaty. The Washington Treaty stipulated that the United States 
2 
aould not increase f6rtifioations in the Philippines and Guam. 
BOth the FOreign Relations OOmmittee::and the Naval Mf'airs O:Om-
mitt.-ee were !.ery critical of the Treaty artrangement~~because the 
1. 
OOrdell Hull, Memoirs of Cl0rdell Hull, New York: Ma.omillam O.'Ompany, 
1948, Ohapter 16. 
2 
!few York Times, May 15, 19;0, P• 1s6 • 
. o-. f. Senate Hearings, Treaty on the Limitation of Naval Armamentts. 
81i 
~eaty emphasized t~o much British and Japanese naval strength •. 
S~nator.Rale, chairman of the Senate Naval Affairs COmmittee, 
attacked the terms of the Treaty and remained opposed t0 the Treatyo 
He maintained, as did the other members of' his committee, thatt 
buildi~up the NaY;y to the tonnage permittad would cause~the 
g_fl?vernment to spend $l,ooo,ooo,ooo instead of reducing:;the naval 
construction coasts. The testimonies of all the naval officers 
reinforc-ed ·Senator Hale t s attitude t"b~rards the tireaty ar.rangementt. 
The nature of R.epuM.ican oppositionJ 
Tlie minority reporltof the Senate Fi>reign Relations Committee· 
submitted by Senators Johnson of California, Mbses of'New Hampshire, 
and Robins on of Indiana (Republicans) depended:.: upon the expert ad vic-e 
of'naval officers •. The minority report expressed the preference 
tc have United States defense rest on~experts who knew defense 
tactics in time of need• The report'weighed those for the Treaty, 
that is Secretary of State Stimson and Se:cretary oft the Navy Adams, 
and Admiral .Pratt.-~ aglilinst those opposed to the Tl'eatys Admirals 
Jones,.Bristol, Chase, Pringle, Schofield, Reeves, Leaky, Hughes, 
' Nulton, Hough, Day, Taylor, Rook, Wiley, RObinsom among _others. 
The list~.of the admiralty who opposed the treaty was impressive. 
' New York Times, June ]O, 19]0, p. 4. CO F"; Senat-e Hearings, T!reaty on the Limitation·:of Naval Armaments. 
e 
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Tl1.e ~:&urr committ'ee members disapproved of' the London Naval T:":reaty 
liecause it failed to give the United States parity in sea strength 
With Gteat Britain or to materially reduce the expenses of' the 
American naval e.stablishment~ The T'i'eaty not only destroyed the 
5s5s' ratio but also was contrary to American naval policyo Tlie 
minority report failed to specifY exactly what was the traditional 
4 
naval policy., 
TF:ie Administration urged speedy approval 
Despite the opposition from Senators Johnson, Mbses, Rtibinson, 
and Shipstead, the treaty was favorably recommended to the.Senate 
5 
for approval by a vote of 16 to 4~ ~~motion proposed to the Sen-
at~ by Senator Johnson, for a postponementtof action on the treaty, 
6 
was lost by a vote of 14 to 4., S~eretary of State Stimson and 
President Hoover had pressed for immediate action on the treaty 
before the Senate session had adjourned. The opposition strategy 
was to obstruot.action and to try to adjourn the session of the 
Senate Without having approved the treaty. 
President Hoover called a special session; of the Senate. 
President Hoover wanted the treaty approved as it was signed 
at London on April 22nd, 19,0. He declared in a message to the 
New York Tlmea, June ;o, 19,0, p. la4. 
5 
New York Times, June 151 1~0, P• l$6. 
Those 0Gmmittee members favoring the treaty were Senators 
Borah, Oapper, Gillett, Reed, Fess, Goff, La Follette, and 
Vandenberg (Republicans), and Swanson, Pittman, Robinson of' 
Ark,, Walsh of Mont., Harrison, Gt=lorge, Black and Wagner (Democrats)., 
6 
-Ibid., p. ls5. The same four Senators opposed. Senators GO~ 
and Black were not voting. 
Senat&-::thatt 11no critic of the treaty would.: be willing::to assertr_. 
that the United States could not defend itself· against outside-
7 
a~ession~1 • The Senate debate ~uring~the special session 
was not a debate on specific terms of the treaty. Senator John~ 
som of -os.Ufornia who had opposed the treaty in committee led the 
opposition· to the treaty in the Senate. Senator Johnson-. questii.on-
ed ·sao:retary Stii.msom for reasons why the United States abandonneci:1 
8 
its bases in the Facific. Seer.etacy Stimson could not~ ao:cord-
ing to Johnson-~ adequately answerrthe questil.ons. Senator Johnsotr' 
also accused Administration leaders of 11secret d.iplomaoy 11 and de-
manded to see or allow the S9nate to ex8.mine the secret papers of 
9 
the Londorn naval negotiations. 
,Senators try to . delay approval 
'rhe ao:cusatil.on:: of-: 11secret neggtiations 11 by. Senator Johnsoro 
caused a considerable delay in the approval of the treaty. A! 
resolution proposed by Senator MoKellantG ask Hoover for the 
secret~treaty data (on Hoover's o\'tn t-erms) was defeated by a vote 
10 
Senators 00peland, Black of Alabama, George 
and Harris of Georgia who favor.ed the treaty, opposed the resolu-
t~on• Tfie President refused to send any cables to the S~nate 
7 
Wew York Times, July 8, 19;0, p. 1:8. 
8:. 
71 (special session~, Senate Hearings, May 14, 19,50. 
9 
:msw York 'l'lmes, July 12, 19~0, p. ls8. 
10 . 
New York T!mes, July 11, 19;0, p. lc8. 
Senator Robinson also proposed an amendment of the same kind. 
Tlie vote was , for, '8; against, 17. Those Republicans opposed 
were Hale, Howell, Johnson, La Follette, Nye, Norris, Oddie 
and Shall. ~· 
liuttcon-creaded(that he would show any papers to individual Senators. 
This statementtinore~sed the charges of secret diplomacy from the 
12 
opposition. HfOWerin, , these charg~s d'id: not >:disruptt. the united 
opinioxr: of:: the remaining Senators. 
The London !fa val Ti'eaty was approved with the adoptio:ro by ar 
lj 
~ice vote of the N~rris amendment. The Wonris amendmentt was 
"that , the Senate ratifies With the understanding_;that there are 
no secrettfiles ••• that in: any way add to the stipulations o:r the 
treaty. 0 
For the treaty: 







Tliose Repunlicans opposed ware Senators Bingham, Hale, Johnsorn, 
Mbsas, Oddia, Pine, and RObinson of Indiana. Tiiose :-Democrats; 
14 
opposed ware MCKellar~ and Walsh· of Massachusetts. 
S£gg.ificancB of:'approval 
Theetreaty passed the Senate without an undue amount~of 
debate. The sectional interests which was characteristic of the 
11 .. 
New York Times, July 12, 19jO, p. ls8. 
12 
lj 
Itt,was at this point of discussion' that the Department·; of State 
intervened to ask quick approval of the treaty. They char~d 
unnecessary delay. 
· Tfiere ware many other amendments proposed prior to adoption of. 
the treaty.. See 71 (spacial session), Oongressional Record, 
pp. '71-8, July 21, 19jO .. 
14 
71 (special session), Oongressional Record, p. j78, July 21, 19jO. 
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naval appropriat'd.ons llilJ. was nottevident:. The tbig6Jlavyt in ... 
t-ereste of the admiralty did not influence the deeply-rooted( idea 
of peace with dd.sarmament'IP Senator Hale of Maine, Easttcoastt 
Republican, and Senator Johnson of Oalifornia, 'lestt coasttRepubli-
can remained consistently opposed to all recommendations and reso-
lutions. These two Senators were the only Senators Who consis-
tently voted againsttthe Republican Administration. The Republican 
party supported the policy of disarmament. The indmvidual opposi-
tlion from the two areas, east and i'Test coast, both areas of sea-
c:oast interest and of naval shipbuilding, did not signify lbig 
navu 1 interest, however. Senator1Moses from New Hampshire was 
the only other Senator who voted againstl.the treaty and Who repre-
sented a sea-coast interest. Tne remaining Democratic and Republi-
can Senators represented interiorrstates. 
East and west coast Re.publicans have usually promoted tbig.: 
navw' interests. However, this 1big navy' policy is nott,always 
promoted by sectional interests. 1 Big navy 1 interest is promoted 
by anJAdministration policy, fOr: during the ROosevelt administra-
tion, the Navy reached its highest peak in terms of guns and ton-
nage .. 
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01 Ohina Aid.and Lend~lease 
Lend-lease causes a policy shiftt 
Tne Sino-Japanese War of 19;7 wgich disrupted the Ear:East~ 
ern.. status ~ left the United States With a policy resting on 
the following foundation• The first principle was the protectio~ 
15 
of American nationals and their legal rights in Onina, and the 
second~ principle was non-intervention in the political issues of 
the war, and the third was the malintenance of'American naval pre-
dominance at least in the Eastern Pacific Ooeam if·:not in the 
We'stern Pacific Ooearr. 
The terms of the discretionary powers of the President·, left 
to the President the decision to invoke the laws of neutrality 
if there was a state of ware. Since some Republicans and Ilemocrats: 
disliked the New Deal program of the ROosevelt Administration~ 
c:ritics of the campaign election: of 1940 maintained that the 
aoosevelt policy w~s for all out war. ROosevelt had previously 
advocated aid~'against aggression:. Wendell L. Wi1kie, the RepulUi-
can candidate, accused ffiosevelt of advocating a policy of no war 
15 
Senator Reynolds gave the following statistics to the S9nate 
While the Senate discussed defense plans.. There were.;in 
July of' 19;7 6,000 American nationals lef'tt in: China. Of' the 
armed forces imChina there were 528 at Peiping, 814 at Tientsin, 
2,555 at Shanghai; the navy had 1; vessels imChina waters, 
1, 671 men, 129 of'f'icers. 
75 (;), OOngressional Record, P• 260, January 10, 1958. 
Department of' State Press Release of' August 2;rd, 1957 was as 
followss "It is the policy of the United States GOvernmentt. 
to af'ford~its nationals appropriate protection ••• FOr that 
purpose it has for many years maintained small detao~nts 
of armed f'brces in China .... " ~., P• 262., 
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cfu.ring:?;the campai~ The Democrats, he maintained, were the wan-
partyJ the Republicans the peace party. Actually no party had ever; 
l:ieen·' pro.-.war. Both parties pledged: aid to the United~Stiates allies. 
(This was a reversal from:the strict neutrality policy of the 
16 
Republicans). The difference was thist the Republican plat-
form insisted that the aid not be in. violatiotn o:f'· international 
law; the Democrats promised all out aid that would-· be consistentt 
with United States law. In this way foreign ai~could be allot~ 
ted:3 as a public expenditure, i. e. Lend-lease.. Tli.is practio.a 
was not according tn international law. It constituted a looP-
hole-for future foreign aid .. Tlie peace promise of both partyrplat ... 
party. Each party had a n'tllJlh!er · off interventionists ;and norr~ 
interventionists. 
~publicans . w·ho were interventionist had favored an· anti-
war platform but insiste~on an"unconditional fo~ei~,aid prow 
g~e.m.. Tli.ere was, then, in the two parties, both points of view; 
eaoh party had a peace platform with a clause for future fOreign 
aid~ 
16 
In; a joint. ;:.resolution1 to prohibit the sale of munitio.ns and arms 
to belligerenttcountries as early a4 August 19,5, those for the 
measure were 79, those opposed were 2. Both were Democrats. 
74 (1), OOngressional Record, P• 114,4, Augustt24, 19'~· 
. . 
As a means for comparison, by 1941 the votes show that the attitude 
is reversed. The vote:::on·:a jointtresolution tcb repeal sections 
of the Neutrality Act of 19j9 was, for, 50; against ;7. " 
Republicans voting against.the resolution were 22; Iremocrats 
were 15. 
77 (1), OOngressional Record, P• 8680, November 7, 1941. 
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The content of Chinese aid 
li7 
Keeping; in mind1 the two sentiment-s ne~rd:tng the European~ 
WBll': anti the American polli.cyy ibl the Farr Eastern situation, the ¥.ol .... 
lowtng~discussion ornaid to Ohtna, specifically, and lend-lease 
im ~neral until 1945 may determine the r.elativ.e consiat1ancy of 
the Uirl.ted1 States policy,. The problem whic}t-J con.:erronted; the Senate 
. and the Senate r-oreigm Relations Co:mm:ift.tee, 1ieside83 implementing; 
the policy of protection~ for .Amerd.o:B.nl c:i tizens, wu to determine 
the amount~ of supportt to be gi van; to the GOv..ernment of Chinaf.a 
The earl}ri aid program: to China was pre paned· mostly 1hy the Foreign 
Relations Committee3and was im the fonrr. of. credit: loans frollll the 
Reconstructicnu Finance Corpora.tion. Jesse Jbnew, Director of the 
RFC testified to the Commi:t.t-ee members that the Reconstruction 
Finance Corporation ha~ made many previous.loans to the Bank of 
18 
China througfu»lt'.:, the thirties. HOw can an: agenny of the Gov~ 
ernment, questioned~Democrauic Senator George of Georgi&:; lbe en-
gagedi im making loans to foreigm governments Whan that government 
is enga.gE?di im a civill warf Senator Geor@ could. not 'Ul'llierstand 
the gra.ntilllg; of a loan t-o a lh:elligerent counteyy;. The lOan·, We.B a:· 
19 
business risk, and im case of wazr, would c:ause more difficulty. 
17 
Nbm-interv.entionists, Democratic Senators Wheeler, McCarr8Jt'., Walsh, 
were V.e'r'Jf: pleasedi witlb the final ll$mocre,.tic platform of a 
n-o war policy. 
18 
76 (~), United St-a.t;es .. Senate Hearmgs..:.o:ftl the Oommi.-ttee . on. 
Foreigw RelatiQJll!t, p .. 1~ f·.,. .January ~1, 1'940. . 
19 '.' 
.!§!!. , p. 64, Re l:truary 6) 194<>. 
There ,;were four credit loans grantedl to Cliina through the 
Export~Import Ba.nk: l:ietween. Decemlhexr 1~, 19~8 to Nov.emller" ~0, 
194<> amounting to $120 million• The payment. wes made by sale 
to the trnn.ted States witlt1sucli1Ch:inese produce u~tung oil, 
tin, tungsten, e.ntimcny. 
The EX}lort..iimport,;- BQik was. ge.ntecli. the authority to lban~ 
r> ~ 
China 2o,ooo,ooo dollars i:ro FrelUuaey of 1940. The measure:::Wlilich 
was entitled the Finnish Aid Bill increase~ the lendimg authority; 
of tlie Bank :fToinl$loo,ooo,ooo to $20o,ooo,ooo. Before the mea;sure 
•. 
was passed by:r a vot.e of 4o to. 27, Walt-er: George of Georgia, 
Russell. of Georgia, Adams of: Colorado, JTohnso:m of Oaliifornia, 
measure, since it was :nott-a.adirecttloa.n specifiCally to Ohina. 
Senator Brown- of Miohltg§lll, and Barkley;' of Xentucq defenaeti the 
20 
measure .. 





The nine Republic:arrl Senators were Senators Austi:m, Ba.rballr, 
Davis, Frazier.; Gibson, Haie~ MCNS.cy,, T'O:wnsemd, and WJ:ii.-11ie~ 






The nine Republicans o~posimg the !l~l were Senator~Oappe~, 
Donaherr; Gurney1:f JbhnsOlll, LOdge, Reedi, Taft, 'fhama.s.~ and Wiley:.;, 
20 
:maw :York Times, February! 14, l9lt!a,. p-. lsl .. 
89 
In the ~use ·;of Represel!Jlt;e.ti v,es: the lbe.n for li!inil.a.m.d and OM:aa 
. .. 21 
was appro~edi l:ly; aavo:t.e o:1f 168 t·o 5).,., Amendments ofirered:i by 
HB..miltorn Fish, Republi:Oanl o:f': New :Y0rk, Eatolll. of- New.vJ:erse~r, 
:J:IJ.ngill of Micbi~ proYided::l for aadirect loB.nl tb FS.nlahcll and 
Ohina. The e.mendments3 were beatem With the suppo·ritv of Admimi.stra.-. 
22 
ti<m~ leaders .. Tiie Umd.it;ed:. States governmenrt;t. loanedi Bnl addition.., 
al $25,000,000 to support. the Chinese governmel'Jlt1~ by'J Septenxban-
of 194o.. The Exporl .... Imporl. l!!S.nk: loe.nt::nwere not the onil.~r direct. 
2~ 
aid Congress provided.' for Ohina• 
24 
Im Fi&bruaey of 1942,, tha Hbuse votecll By' aecla.ma.tion a 
$500,000,000 loam to OM.na.. The Bill was them referred:i to the 
21 
lfew York Times, February ·29, 194o, p,., le 
22 
The Neutrality, Act o oulli be inVoketii,, but' .. the Adlnil\lli.si.re.tiom 
woula nott imroke the Aet.. · Some Senators wa:mt;ed thiS poliCy 
to 'be · irn effect. 
2~-
The tre.nsferrto Ohl.ila acco1ll\!Jt,'l:J of l!lim:t'i;edl States financiaL aid 
authorized:; im 1942 wa.s ; the , fo llowi.itg# 
April 1942 t;~o md.lllom 
1~ . 4{1) 
1944 20 
194) 225 
1946 16 =e5~030~md.~l-l-io;.oo.· n..-::.... -. 
24 
t1mi.ted States Dipari.ment of Stat.-&--:; llbiUt.eil Stat-es Relaticms 
with Ohba, Waslii.ngtol!llS Government. Printmg;Office, 1949, 
l\1Bw..-Ybrk Times, Febr~ary 5-' 1942, p. 4n. 
The only comments were made:olly · 1\epresentati vee MbClbmic-k. and 
HB.miltom Fislb, wl:io were spokesmern for the Hbuse Foreign 
Affairs Oommit.tee. 
During discussion of Olii.lm aid im Oon-gress i nothing~ oro Olii.Da:o 
aid was written 1m the scnolarlq periodicalS. The Public:: 
.QP.inli.Olll Quarterly, for example, does not ha~e anw- sipfican:t 
statistics om OhUls. aid. .. 
\ 
91. 
8enat&r.. Senat'or1 TOm. Obnnailly, chairman: of'".'" the Floreign Relations; 
Oammittee, reported the.; O~mmittee unanimously in favor.>. of the Bill. 
OOnne.lly explained t"b Senator T"aft~,who inquired about the terms 
of"lend-lease, that the aid was supplemental and not a subst~tute. 
26 
The Senate approved the Bill by a vote of 74 to 0. 
'l'be beginning of lend-lease aide 
Although many Congressmen felt that more aid should be given 
to Ohina, in the overall lend-lease bills passed by Oongress from· 
1941 to 1945, Roosevelt and Administration,leaders believed thatt 
27 
Great Britain-: needed the immediate help more than Ohina. The,-, 
lend-lease program With the aid of Administration leaders passed 
Oongress speedily and with comparative unity. The debate in the 
Senate was limited to a few hours and the Senate accepted the 
pr0gram without a question, for the groundwork was laid in Oo .. 
mittee. The first ~Lend-lease Bill tb implement all out aid ofr 
-$71000,000 was passed by the S9nate Marc~:25th 1941 by a vote of 
28 






7T (2), Congressional Record, p. lo40, F".ebruary 5, 1942. 
26 . 
_lli!._, P• lo41. 
27 
This stand was a statement of policy. PresidentLRCoseveltts 
fire-side ehat~of December 1.940 was the statement of this 
policy. -·New York Times, D.eeemberi ~1, 1940, p. 1. 
28 
N"ew York Tames, Mlrch 17, 1941, p. 6. 
25 




Sane.tors BUtler, Langer, Nye, Shipstee.d, and Thomas of Idaho were 
the five Repub[ice.ns in opposition• 
Pe.ri.;Yy unity on the extension' of: lend"'* lease. 
The extensiorn of' lend-lease in 194;, 1944, and.l945 ev..oked,' 
one ms.in line of~ criticism from the Senate. Senator Vandenbergc.: 
of( Michigan stated that the e.greementttended tb make e. ~neral 
post-we.rccommitmenttt-o support world economic relations. The. 
United ·states should not encoure.g~ e. polioy:~·o:f" postt;.we.r economic 
e.i&lwhen:the future stability of-the nation could not be fbreseen:• 
If tlh.is,3Were to be the intentiorn of the United States, he me.it&-
tained,, it should be stated e.t'the renewal of the lend-lease bill.,. 
In this we.y, the pulfl.ic e.nnouncementt ofr e. post4-warx commitment1to 
support.world economie r:elat+ions;;would allow the Senate to agree 
or d1se.~ee With the future comitment while approving the immediate 
lend-lease bills. Future commitments would mean contilnuing; the 
war econoxey, high taxes and abundant expenditures, e.tt,the expens~ 
of··the budggts of the American people. Re.publican criticism B.gt:J,.inst~. 
any implicationJof''postt-we.r commitments followed this line--o:F 
reasoning. The members of' the Approprie.tioro crcmmi ttee. usually 
asked for cuts in the amounttof' the appropriations before the 
29 
~nat-e2and: HO:use approul of the lend.-. lease bills. However, 
o:.ritie:ism ag~nst ~the bills did nott.disrupt cthe united action of: 
the parties on ·the bills. 
Tiie extension of lend-lease in.~ 194~ was approved by the HOuse .. 
by' a vote of 4o7 to 66; TJie siJC: votin&:aga.inst the e:Jttension of the 
bill were Representatives O:rawford, Woodrl.tf'l"; and Brehm of Michigan, ;o . 
Jones and Sn:d th of Ohio, and Elmer of Missouri. Tfu3 Senat-e: 
:?1 
approved the Bill by a vote of".82 to o. 
:?2 
The Senate approved the 1944 extension by·a vote of 6; tof• 
(Senator Langer of~North Dakota, Republican, was the only one in· 
-
opposition.) The Senate sgggest~d that the appropriations be 
otlnfined to military needs. Ittwas onthis issue, to curiliaid.: 
l:ieyond' military necessity and to curb: the plans fOr post't.-wari re-
lief•' and rehalii.litation) which made Republicans in·: both the House 
and ·senate hostile to the lend-lease extension bill in 1945.. Repre.-. 
sent.ati ve Ol'J.iperfield.r' of "Illinois, W:Jrys of· Ohio, MUndtt of· S.Outh 
Dakota, Jonkma:n-: of:" Michigan) Smith of Wisconsin, members of the 
lfouse Committee on: filreign Affairs were aga.insttthe extension 
;; 
of lendwlease after the war. The House; therefore, adopted 
lend-lease by a vote of :?54 to 28 with the restrictiomof no 
29 
;o 
78 (1), 00n$ssional Record, .P· 1847, M:lrch 11, 194;, P• 4096 ... 8, 
Miy 8, 1 • Senator McKellar of Tennessee, Democrat:. was 1:.he 
member of 1:.he Appropriations COmmittee Who wanted cuts in the 
appropriation. 
New York Times, March 11, 194:?, p. ls6~ 
:?1 
78 (1), Oongressiona1 Rec~rd, p. 18;;; March 11, 194;. 
:?2 ' 
78 (2), OOngressional Record.; p. 4lo6; May 8; 1944. 
;; 
New York Times, March 9, 194:?, p. 20. 
11 post~war:relief', rehabilitation, or reconstructiotr. 11 
sentative White, Jlemocratt. of': Idaho plus 27 Republicans:; nearly 
all from the middle west, voted againsttthe extension-. The:. 
~5 
Senate,~e:x:tended the Acttby a unanimous voice vote. 
'J.'heedd.stribution of' lend-lease in the IDa.r Eastt. (Ohina, India, 
~6 
Australia, and New Zealand) was only 11.~% of' the whole program, 
buttmany Senators had urged a larger:. propoll'tiimn of lend-lease aid·. 
tb the Far Eastern countries • The Ohina aid: program sigg.if'ie&., ae 
o:onsistent and continual interest~:by the Administration) and by 
the members of' ctbngress imFce.r~Eastern~a:f'fairs, although the 
original Open Door had ceased to exist in practise;and although 
the protectiorr;of' American nationals was no longer possible. 
~ 
New York Times; March 14, 1945, p. 1. 
~5 
TWo amendments were shouted down by the House. Representat~ve 
Bi..tf'l'ett. ·~-of' Ne blraska suggested pro hi biting .the President from 
using:lend-lease :for any post-war purpose. 
Secretary Stettiniua stated that the lend-lease admin-
istrator controlled the transfer and transporttof' aid, when 
he was questioned by members of' the House Committee and the 
Senate Committee. It was :felt by the members of' these co~ 
mittees that China should have received more aid. 
Flrom United States House of' Representatives, Hearings on·. the 
COmmittee .on1 F"oreign Af'f'airs, January 194~, March 1944 .. 
«n~ United States Senate, Hearings on the &bmmittee on1F.Oreiro; 
Relations, March 194~, April 1944. 
79 (1), OOngressional Record, P• ~246, ·April 10, 1945. 
~6 . 
78 (1), United States Senate, Hearings, April 1944. 
a:mro:LUS Ji~.· 
The interestt. of the Republican-1 party im FS.rrEastern afi'S.irs ; 
stemmed from the times of the opening of OHina to United States 
trade. Tlie Republice.:rr party policy im Far· Eastern affairs was not 
cnnscious and deliberate. These qualifying words appear to dis-
count almosttwholly the chance oi.rcumstano:es Which the RepublicSJr. 
party enc:ountered· both at home and al:)road during the years of the 
form.ulation~of the F.e.r:Easttpolioy, circumstances which,.have been-, 
taken into acroounttabove and which; it has been: demonstrated b'y 
the analysis of Congressional voting, influence!L Republica.n: think-
ing no less than.primarily commercial and territorial interests• 
T'f'aditional ideas, basedron·traditional sentiment as well as 
prec-edent~ of whattkind of policy Republicans as Rapublicans-
or!Democrats as Democrats should favor~ appear to be invalid in 
the case of the Republican party and the Far East policy. The 
~ 
dist~notion should always be kept in mind as to what a Republi-
95 
can administration~wants ac:complished and what Republican Oongress-
men~mighj.tfavors the two do not always work together. 
T!ie consistency of the Republican party policy in the Far;. 
East was dependenttupon:~publican party interest and concern; 
im Fa.rrEistern affairs. The original Open .Door policy was the 
primary policy perpetuated in-the Far Easttby the Republican party. 
Tne integrity of China was the first concern: of the Open Door:. policy., 
T~e failure t~ have Shant~returned to Ohina was on~ of Wilsonts 
failures in carrying out his Open' Doorr policy in the Far:,·East'-Le Re-
publica.n- opposition to having:;Japan- retain Shantung was also, att 
the beginning of the WashingtonOonf'erence, opposed by Wilson. 
The Four-Pbwer Treaty of the Washington Conference was in keeping 
With the original Open Door policy, for the Treaty, defined the 
status quo as it<. existed under the terms of the Open Doorl policy .. 
Tlia London Naval Oonf'erence was cone:srned With the Open Door1 policy .. 
By limiting.the size of the Japanese fleet-dn the hcific, the 
int.egt:ity of'Oliins. would be safe-guarded. 
Republican party interest _in perpetuat-ing the Open Door policy 
in the FarrEisttmust be considered as separate fronn Republican: 
administration interest in. Far Eastern a:f'i'airs. The consistentt 
interest of the party and the administration differed in degree. 
Republican party leaders of Republican administrations realized 
the importance to the United States of maintaining the Open Door 
policy. Republican leaders of the Hoover Administration realized 
the strategic importance to the United States of the Philippine 
Islands. The party interest is not at all times the same as the 
interest of the administration, although the party may agree t~ 
the policy of the administratione Riboseveltfs 1big;stick1 policy 
was necessary, in his opinion, to maintain the integrity of China 
in the Fal'l East. Some of the members of the Repub~ican party sup-
ported ROoseveltrs 1big:,navy 1 poiicy .-but not to maintain the inte-
grity of C}lina in the Far E8:st. East and west coasttRepublicans 
were more interested in a possible ship-building:Jloom Which a: 
large naval appropriatio.n would eventually make. The interior· 
western Re.publicans did not s'upporttthe ROosevelt rbig navy' pro-
gram because interior states were notLe:f'f'ected by a larger naval . 
appropriation. 
Tl'ie limiting factors of' Republican participationin the formu-
lation of Far!Eastern policy also make for inconsistencies in 
the Far Eistern policy. One must recall that Theodore Roosevelt 1s 
intervention in the RUsso-Japanese War of' 1905 was part of an 
executive agreement. Other issues involving:..;; the Open Door policy 
in the Far East·fwere not· based on: executive agreement but rather 
"' 
ompreliminary con£erences conducted by the representatives of' 
the administration and the minority party;. Tlie open:, discussion. 
im Congress of' Far East~ policies point up the limiting factors 
in obtaining party unity on foreign. policy issues. The limiting 
97' 
98 
:fl""e.ot.or of sectionalism we.s e. factor for evaluating,the reasons 
for the approval of·the appropriations bills between 1912 and 1915. 
Sectionalism was also a factor for evaluating the causes for the 
acceptance-of Philippine independence. The combined economic in-
terests of cane-sugar and beet-sugar producers aligned politically, 
to form an agrarian bloc iroCongress which was able to apply pres-
sure for tariff revision and ~ilippine independence. Individual 
opposition also limited United party a~ion on issues effecting 
FarrEasttpolicy. The Four-Power Treaty of the Washington: Con!-
ference was consistently opposed by Senators Borah, Johnsont ~ranee, 
and La Follette. The 0irreconcilable 11 group of Republicans, whose 
voting record was a great disappointment to the party, opposed 
the Shantung-amendment and the Lodge resolution. 
Tiere were, then, between 1920 and 1945, two issues which con-
f6rmed to a consistent policy e.nd which obtained unified action· 
by the Republicanr.members in Congress. These two issues were 
the lend-lease program for China and the approval of the London 
Naval Treaty of 1~0. Most of the .mtpublican members i:xr. Congress 
accepted the administration leadership at the Washington Conference. 
There were only four dissenters to the Four-Power Treaty; a co~ 
paratively small numbe·r. On the other hand, however, Republicans 
99 
aaigg:ed:i Witb:·Democrats in:;order to pass the Jihilippine independence 
bill over the veto of President Hoover. 
TB recapitulate, then, one, the consistency of the Far East 
policy was dependentt.upon the interest of the party in the F!arr 
East, in the light of the events discussed; two,the primary 
interest ofrthe Republican party was not at all times the pri-
mary interest of the administration; three, the limitin~factors . 
... 
of Republican· party participation in- shaping Far East·', policy 
. A 
were the vested interests of groups or of individuals; and, 
four, the united action of the Re.publican party could be in 
aceordance.:;with the policy of either a Republican-; or Democratic-, 
administration• For example, Senator Johnson of Califo~ia 
led the opposition against g:i;ving Japan the Shantung peninsula. 
And Senator Vandenberg of Michigan. consistently pressed for 
Pijilippine independence, and in t~is, he was not alone among 
Republicans. Though individual Senators might assume the leader-
ship of their·party f'or various reasons, as personal convictions 
on-· foreign policy, the analyses of roll call votes shows thatt 
these Senators do not consistently vote along party lineae Many 
votes cut across party lines because of' sectional interests. 
Groups of Senators band together to protect vested interests 
despi~e the fact ~hey go coun~er ~o adminis~ra~i~a policy. 
Bo~h Hoover and-- S~i:inSon adVised agains~-: lihilippine independence; 
ye~ Republican Sena~ors:Who represen~ed bee~4-sugar growing 
sta~es aligned Wi~h Democratic Sena~ors ~Q pass ~he bill. 
Tliie discussions of ~he naval appropria~ions bills were divided 
according ~o sectional in~erests.. The London Naval Conference 
was a.n example of ~he Republican: parly supporling Republioaro 
policy; ~he lend-lease program for China was an example of the 
Republican party-supporting a Democratic adminis~r.ation. 
Whe~her ~he Republican party had a majori~y imCongress or 
whether a Repub!l.ican administre.~ion was in power, ~he interest_ 
in,the F!.r-cEas~ was essen~ially Republican. Republican Sana-
~ors and Republican administration leaders were ~he first ~o 
inquire into the future consequences and future commitments 
of issues concerning Fare E~stern affairs. Why the Republica..n 
members of Congress ·or the Republioa..n administration display- _ 
ed a more vital interest in even~s concerning Far Eas~ern1af-
fairs it is dif'fiou.lt t'b say, Tlle historical consequences 
of the Open-: Dbor policy 1 the a.nnexa~ion of the Philippine_ 
I~lands, and the promotion of investment in Chinese business 
ventures during Republic am administr_ations, are the moat plausi-
. -_ '.·•,- ~ 
b~e reasons for Republican interest in~Far Eastern affairs .. 
~ 
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TB.& 67th and1 68th Cbngresses, 1922, Sene:b$'2 
O'Al vin:; Oholidg§!, Repub1icattJ of' Miss., President of the Senat'e 
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M?.FEND!XtA _ (c:ontinued:) 
.. Iowa Albert Oi:umnins R. 
Smith Brookhart R 
Kansas OH.arles Ourtis R 
Arthur.~ Oappen R 
Kentucky' Rich Ernst"; R 
A,· o .. Stanley D 
Louisiana Edwin1 B'rotissard: . D 
Joseph Ransdell. D 
Mainee Frederick Hale R 
Bertt Fernald· R 
Maryland= Will. Bruce D 
o. E. Weller.c R 
Mass. Henry Lodge R 
D. F. Walsh D 
Michigan Woodbridge IDerris D 
Jani.es 00uzens R 
Minnesota Hendrik Shipstead:: Ft, 
Knute Nelso:ro R 
Mississippi Hubert Stephens D 
Pat Harrison~ D 
Missouri . James Reed::1 D 
s. P. Spencer I R 
Mon-tana B-;. K. Wheeler.c D 
Thomas Walsh D 
Nebraskar:e Ralph Howell R 
George-oNor.ris R 
Nevada Key Pittman D 
~ T .. L. Oddie R 
N. H. Henry Key-,s R 
Gaor~ Moses · R 
NPFENDIX'\A (continued) f. New Jersey Edward:iEdwar.ds, D 
Wal tel': Eng~: R 
N"ew Mexico Andrius Jones D 
Holm :a-ursum' R 
New.York Royal Wadswol'ltttl D 
JamesJ Wadsworth R 
North OArolina Lee::~ 0\1terma.ro. D_ 
Fnrnifol~Simmo~~ D 
., 
Nbrt"if Dak:otae Lynn.Frazien R 
E. F. La.d:cb R 
Ohio Simecm Fess .. R 
Frank Willies R 
Oklahoma J. w. Harreld': R 
Ra lie rtt 0Wen1 D 
Oregqm R81:iertt Stta.nfi.eld' R 
Oharles M6Nacy R 
Penn. David·: :mtedd R 
George .Pepper:r m 
Rhose Island:1 Pet-ere Ger.l\1.,: D 
LeBaron~ Oblf.t R 
South: Carolina. Ellison·. Smith D 
Nat h. Dial D 
South Dakota Peter,·NOrl:!e~k R 
Thomas Starlin~; R 
'l'e:rmessee Kenneth McKeller1· D 
Johnl Siiields:, D 
~xas3 Earle J.ii.y:rield·' D 
Morris Sheppard·~ D 
~· 
Utah Wi:ll. King~ D 
Reed Smoott R 
MPEimiX:A (c:ontinuedi) 
... Wermontt F""rank Gr..ene.~ R 
Wm. Dillingham R 
V:!l.~niae OlaudecSwanso:nJ D 
Oart-err Glass D 
WasbingtolD en 0~. lllll. D 
Wesley. JonesJ R 
W&st Virginia·. M. M. Neely· D 
Davis Elkim9 R 
Wi/sconsim RO lie rtt La Fo llett-'ee R 
Invine .. Lenroott R 
Wyomings John Kendric-k D 
rrancis War.ren- R 
TI:I.e 7lstt and 72nd Congresses, 1920, Senatec 
Oiiarles OUrtis, Repub-lican; of Kansas, .President"~of the Senate 
The 7lst~:Oongress The:: 72iid ObnfiresS3 
RS 52 R 48 
D 42 D 47 
FL 1 FL 1 
AlQ.bama. .TI:I.om.. Heflin: D 
HugQ Black D 
Arizona' HenX7 Ashurstt D 
Oarl Hayden~ D 
Arkansas TI:I.addeus CAraway D 
Joseph:Rdbinsom. D 
CAlifornia Hiram Johnson R 
Sam. Shortridg~ R 
COlorado Lawre~e Phipps R 
Charles Wate~ R 
Comneotioutt P'"r.ed'6 Woloottt R 
Hiram Bingham R 
. D'elaware John TCliwnsend' R 
Daniel Hasting~:; R 
Florida :t:ark T""rammell D 
DU'ncan-, Fletcherc D 
Georgia Walt·er_ George D 
William Hanr.d.s.> D 
Idaho J ohm THomas R 
Will. Borah R 
Illinois; Ob.arles Deneenc R 
Ot'.is Glenn R 
Indiana Arthur Robins on: R 
James Watso:ro R 
MiENDlXC :a ( o:ontinued) 
~~· Iowa Smith Brookhartt R 
- Daniel S-teck D 
Kaneas.J George McGill D 
A.rthurdlapper1 R 
Kentucky" Ben• Williamsoro D 
Aloen·· Barkley n: 
Louisiana·· Edwim Br.oussard:: D 
Joe. Ran-sdell D 
Maine: FTed. Hale R 
Arthur Gould· R· 
Ma.rylan-dl Fhillip Goldsboroug~ R 
Millard Tj'dings_ ; D 
Maese Fred. Gilletltt R 
David Walsh D 
Miohi~1 A.. H~ Vandenberg::; R 
James Couzens R 
Minnesota' Henrill: Shipstead. FL 
Thomas Scfuoll. R 
Mississippi'. Hu1:>erttStephens D 
Pat c Harrriso:m D 
Missouri Roso~e Pattersoro R 
Harry HawesJ D 
Montana Hurtbn, Wheeler1 D 
Thomas Walsh D 
Nebraska Ro llerttHciwell R 
George: Norris R 
N"evada Key P:i:t-tman D 
Tasker Oddie R 
.. 
.. 
N .. H. Henry Ke~s' R 
George: Moses R 
M?H!:NlliX\li (aontinued:) 
iAIIJt' Wew Jersey Rami 1 ton. Klan. R 
Dwight MOrrow R 
l'te'lt Mexico Bronson: Cutting,; R 
Sam. Bratt om D 
!\few York Ro~l O:Opeland D 
Ro l:ie rt-t, Wa·gtten D 
Nbrth Carolina Lee ; Overman D 
FUrnifold;Simmons D 
N'"orth Dakota. liY'mtt Frazierr R 
Gerald N"yec R 
Ohio Simeon F-ess: R 
Rob'ert Bulkley D 
Oklahoma w. B'. Pine R 
Elm.err·Thomas D 
Oreg()m CJaarles McNary R 
Fred. Steiwer> D 
Penm. D.avid1 Reed· R 
James Davis R 
Rliose Island Felix:Heliertt R 
Jesse Metcalf. R. 
South C!irolina Ellison Snli th'- D 
0:0 lemam lB\lease; D 
South Dakota Peter Norbeck R. 
w. }f.; MoMaster1· R 
Tennessee. Kenneth McKellar:: D 
Wm. Brook D 
'l':Bxas 'ranr. Oonnally , D 
~ Merrie Sheppard' D 
Ut.ah Wm .. King; D 
Reed · Smoott R 
A.P:EEEDlX'( B' (c-ontinued::) 
Vermoni;t. Frank Greene R 
-
Por.t-'en· Dale ·. R 
Virgi;ni.a O!aude Sira.nsoro D 
OB.rter Glass D 
Wa'shingtom o .. O. Dill D 
Wt:tsley Jones R 
WesttVirginia Henry Hatfield.: R 
GUiv' Gof~ R 
Wisconsm Robe rtt LaFo llett.&: R 
Jomm ll!le.ine . R 
Wyoming-£ JbhU! Kendrick D 
RQ b'e rt t o-a.ry R 
Sena~e Forei~Rala~ions Co~ttee, 1941 
Key Pitt.n~an, Nebraska., CH.airn~an: 
D 
Fat Harrison, Missouri 
Walter George, Georgia 
Roberti.Wagner, New York 
Tom Connally, Texas 
Elbert·~Thon~as, Utah 
Fred. Van Nuys,Indiana 
James Murray, Montana 
L. Sohwellanbach, Washington. 
Claude Fepper, Florida 
Theodore Green, R~ Ie 
Alben Barkley, Kentucky 
Robert Reynolds, North Carolina 
Joseph Guffey, Faun. 
Guy Gillette, Iowa 
Bennett C~ark, Missouri 
R 
Hiram Johnson-, California 
Arthur Oapper, Kansas 
Robert LaFollet~e, Wisoonsinl 
Arthur Vandenberg, Michigan 
Wallace White, Maine 
Henrik Shipstead, Minnesota 
House.Oo~~tee orr FOreign Affairs, 1941 
Sol Bloom, N"ew York, CH.airmBnl 
D 
Luther Johnson, nxas 
John, Kee, West Virginia 
James Richards, South Carolina 
James Shanley, Connec~icu~ 
Joseph Pfeifer, New York 
Fete Jarmon; Alabama 
Lawrence Arnold, Illinois 
W. 0. Burgin, North Carolina 
Wirt Courtney, Tenl:XJ3ssee: 
Herman~Eberharter, Penn. 
Noble Gregory, Kentucky 
Thad Wasielewski, Wisoonsitt 
Robert Sikes, Florida 
Jason:Davis, Ohio 
R 
Hamiltoro Fish, New York 
Oharles Eaton, New Jersey 
George 'finkham, Mass. 
Edith ROgers, Mass. 
RObert·;.Cb.iperfield, Illinois 
J ohrr Vorys, Ohio 
Fos~er Stearns, N. H. 
Karl MUndt1 South Dakota 
Bartol Jonkman; Michigan 
~anoia BOlton~ Ohio 
Senate Oommittee on,~erritories and Insular Af£aire, 7lst:OOngress; 
2nd · Sessioltl 
Hirrun B'ingham, Connecticut, OH.airmam 
R 
Hira.m Bingham, Conn·. 
Hirrun Johnson~ OB.li:f'~ 
Arthur RObinson, Indiana 
Gerald · Nye, North Dakota 
Jesse Metcalf I R~ I. 
Arthur Vandenberg, Michigan 
GuiY" Gofi', West Virginia 
B'ronson- Outting, New Mexico 
Key Pittmaxr, l'fevada 
William Harris, Georgia 
Edwin Broussard, Louisiana 
O~rl Hayden, Arizona 
Millard 'cyding!, M:tryland:: 
Har~;Hawes, Missouri· 
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T.hes·strat-eg;o importance to the United States of island 
bases in the P.aoifi~ Ocean and the maintenance there of defense 
:t'Orces, together with recent charges on the part-:of leaders of 
the Republicarr1party concerning~the political inept~tude of the 
Far~Easttpolicy of the Truman Administration have served to a 
considerable degree in forcing an evaluation of American Farr 
East policy in general and a consideration, specifically, of~ 
the role of the Republican party in shaping,~that policy. Itt 
is, therefore, the purpose of this thesis to determine the con-
sistency of that policy which the Republican party maintains 
tbwards the FarYEast-~ It :i.s the purpose of this thesis to point 
up the united and disunited action taken by ~pubaioan administra-
tions and by members of the Republican party on issues involving 
the formulation of a Far East'~ policy. 
T~e first two chapters of this thesis deal With the begin-
nings of the Open Door policy and the definition of the status 
quo in the Far East. F:Ou~ basic principles ggverned the United 
States policy towards the.Far:East •. The firsttwas the Open DOor 
(1898-19;8); the second, the integrity of Cfiina (l922)J the 
third, non-intervention and non-recognition of Japanese interests; 
and the fourth, collective security or the codification of the 
Open Dbor (Washington·, Conference of 1922). Attno time had Am-
ericans been willing to fight for the Open-Door policy. Presi-
dent;_R6osevelt•s policy in the Far E.i:i.st;; during the Russo-Japanese 
Warr, did not reflect Republican party interest. RO.osevelt 1 s 
1 big navy' program was part of his policy of maintaining the 
Open Door policy in the FB.r"East;. The Republican party support, 
of his navy program represented sectional and partisan interests. 
Tl'ie Shantung?;question of the Tlt'eaty of Peace with Germany 
~nd~,~the Washington:· Conf'erence of 1922 are considered as two 
new aspects of the Open Door policy from 1919 to 1922. The 
Shantung question arising from:the Treaty of Peace With G$rmany 
is seen·. as beirrg -;the cause of a split within:, the ranks of the 
Republican party. The Washington Conference illustrates a 
split in the Republican ranks as a result of personal convio-
tii.om. From 1905 to 1922, Republican party attitudes and poli-
cies were sponsored by executive leadership; for a Republican 
administration as representing a small proportion of the Republi-
can party determined Far Easttpolicy in the twenties., 
In additiomto executive leadership and personal leadership 
in the Senate as limitations in formulating foreign policy, 
there are t.he limit.ing result.s of vest.ed int.erest.s, and t.he 
issues of t.he Philippine independence bill, discussed in t.he t.hird 
ohapt.er, reveal how Republican,Senat.ors represent.ing special in-
t.erest.s vot.ed in opposit.ion t.o t.he policy of a Republican admin-
ist.rat.ion. Tfie vest.ed int.erest., in t.his inst.ance, was t.he in-
t.erest. of t.he farmer, t.he beet. and cane sugar1grower, who, be-
cause of t.he compet.ing sugar market. of t.he Philippines, was an-
xious t.o give t.he Philippines her independence. The problem of 
an evaluat.ion of t.he issues of Philippine independence was a 
t.hreef6ld problem. First., t.here was t.he problem of t.he beet'~ 
sugar' growers in obt.aining market.s for t.heir crops. Then t.here 
was t.he problem of t.he t.ari~ ball amendment.s, Which provided 
for a bount.y payment. :.t.o sugar: ~wars as prot.ect.ion; a~inst.t. 
Philippine sugar. And furt.hermore, t.here was t.he problem of! 
t.he st.rat.egic value of t.he Philippines t.o t.he Unit.ed stat.es 
Which was t.he primary considerat.ion of t.he administ.rat.iorr. 
The ,sect.ional int.erest.S3 inJ O'"ongress usually have been t.hose 
int.erests which were more concerned with domestic affairs. Do~ 
-
est.ic issues, such as t.he sugar cl~uses of t.he ~ariff Bill of 
1950 and t.he sugar quot.as of the Philippine independence Bill, 
OQmpelled t.he representat.ives in Congress t.o heed t.he demands 
of t.heir const.ituent.s. The sect.ional cleavages came during t.he 
thirt~es when the depression caused conflicts on these and 
other domestic issues. Nottall the foreign policies which 
directly or indirectly influenced Far Eastern affairs were 
formulated.'to oater:i;o the sectional cleavages of the nation. 
Some of the policies formulated on the Far' East, such as the 
Senate approval of the Lon&omNaval Treaty of 19J0 and the 
House?and Senate approval of the lend-lease program for Ohina, 
did•'not point up sectional cleavages. These two aspects of 
Far East policy are interpreted in the light of unified party 
acceptance of a policy formed by a Republican administration; 
(Hoover in 1~0) and a Democratic administration (Roosevelt 
in 1940). 
The interest of the Republican party in IDar Easte~ affairs 
started from the times of the opening of Ohina to United States 
trade. The consistency of the Republican party policy in the 
Far1·East was dependent'.upon·: Republicam party ~t~~st·~-in Fan-
Eastern affairs •• Republican interest in perpetuating the Open 
Door policy in the ~ar East.must be considered as separate from 
Republican administration interestT,in Far Eastern affairs •. The 
limiting £actors in RSpublican~ participation in the formulation: 
of Fkr Eastern, policy also make for inconsistencies in Far Eastern 
policy. Tlie hist.orioal consequences of·t.he Open Door policy, the 
annexat.ion of t.he Philippine Islands, and,'t.he promot.ion: of invest.-
ment. in·· CHinese business vent.ures during_Republican administ.rat.ions, 
are t.he most. plausible reasons for Republican int.erest. in' F1!..r1· EAst.-
ern affairs. 
